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CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON MEMBERSHIP
IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Liat Levanon*
The article analyzes prohibitions on membership in terrorist organizations and
examines their justifiability. It begins by providing a definition of a terrorist
organization. It then describes the far-reaching modern prohibitions on mem-
bership in terrorist organizations in various jurisdictions. The article goes on to
provide a doctrinal analysis of membership offenses. Based on similarities with
conspiracy doctrine, membership offenses are analyzed as expansions of attempt
law or, in some cases, of complicity doctrines. The justfiability of this expansion
is examined. The article introduces a distinction between exclusively terrorist
organizations, passive membership of which can be legitimately prohibited
under certain conditions, and ancillary and dual-purpose organizations, passive
membership of which cannot be legitimately prohibited. Next, the justiflability
ofprohibiting more active forms of membership in each of these types of organ-
izations is discussed. Last, guidelines for the legislation of appropriate prohibi-
tions are proposed.
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Criminalization of membership in terrorist organizations has become
fairly widespread in recent years. Legislatures have energetically enacted,
prosecutors have enthusiastically indicted, and courts have resolutely
adjudicated to interpret these prohibitions and determine their exact
scope. Criminalization of active participation in dangerous activities
conducted by terrorist organizations seems straightforward. Crimina-
lization of lesser forms of involvement raises difficult questions of justi-
fication.
The main thrust of this article propounds that legal systems have
been unable to design satisfactory prohibitions that would allow for
maintaining a legal equilibrium in this complicated area of criminal law.
Legislatures, courts and criminal justice authorities have all been pulling
in different directions in an attempt to winnow out those cases appro-
priate to criminalization, but without much success. Drawing upon doc-
trinal analysis and its normative evaluation, this article seeks to delineate
the appropriate scope for the criminalization of membership in such
organizations.
Part I introduces initial definitions, distinctions, and background
knowledge necessary for evaluating prohibitions on membership in ter-
rorist organizations. It provides a narrow working definition of terrorist
organizations as exclusively terrorist organizations, rather than as organiza-
tions with additional civil objectives. It then explores the differences be-
tween terrorist organizations and radical antigovernment organizations, as
well as between terrorist organizations and organized crime groups. Next,
the interests protected by prohibitions on membership in terrorist organi-
zations are examined. It shall be demonstrated that liability is imposed be-
cause of the remote risk of grave harm to highly important legal interests.
Last, a comparative overview of recent prohibitions on membership in ter-
rorist organizations is introduced. The overview lays out the judicial dis-
tinction between passive and active membership, a distinction that will
be more accurately defined and developed further in later parts of the
article.
Part II presents a doctrinal analysis of membership offenses. First, the
relationship between membership offenses and conspiracy doctrine is ex-
amined, concluding that they closely resemble each other. Based on this
resemblance, this part continues to consider membership offenses as ex-
ceptional expansions of the scope of attempt law (in some cases) or of
complicity doctrine (in other cases).
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Part III examines the justifiability of this expansion of criminal law. It an-
alyzes the attribution of the remote risk (which was identified in Part I)
to members of terrorist organizations. This part concludes that the risk of
terrorist attacks can be fairly attributed to "passive-nominal" members only
when the organization is a highly dangerous one that conforms with the
narrow definition of terrorist organizations introduced in Part I ("exclusively
terrorist organisations"). Where participation is active, the risk can be attrib-
uted more easily and in a wider range of cases. Next, Part III introduces more
detailed conclusions regarding the appropriate scope and structure of mem-
bership offenses. It does so by formulating certain additional distinctions
among different types of passive membership and different types of active
membership. Last, this part reflects on the appropriate mens rea of the pro-
posed offenses.
The Conclusion draws attention to some possible abstractions of the
analysis.
The method of this paper is to draw normative conclusions based on
comparative research and theoretical analysis. This method has been
adopted in the belief that it is capable of illuminating important aspects
that are elusive when observing a single jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
danger of reaching reductive conclusions, which is inherent to such a
method, should be kept in mind when reading this paper.
Prohibitions on membership in terrorist organizations are applied ex-
tensively and cover different types of conduct. Accordingly, the article
seeks to observe those associations with terrorist organizations that
should be presumably dangerous. In other words, the observation of the
relevant conduct does not confine itself merely to the act of joining ter-
rorist organizations and the status of membership. Rather, the article
looks at the various conduct that has been used as a basis for conviction
in membership offenses (even where such conduct can constitute anoth-
er related offense such as training in weapons or possession of explo-
sives). These forms of conduct are referred to as "different forms of
membership." In addition, the observation of positive criminal prohibi-
tions does not confine itself merely to prohibitions on joining or remain-
ing a member, but rather also includes prohibitions on other more
glaring associations between an individual and a terrorist organization.
As we shall see, these prohibitions have been described as very close to
membership offenses.
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1. ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND
The aim of this part is to define and describe the subject matter of the
article. Section A provides a definition of terrorist organizations and differ-
entiates terrorist organizations from nonviolent antigovernment associa-
tions and from violent criminal organizations. Section B defines the
interests protected by membership offenses and clarifies the connection of
prohibitions on membership to future terrorist attacks. Section C de-
scribes the legal realities of membership offenses in various jurisdictions,
raising and describing some of their more problematic aspects.
A. Initial Definitions and Distinctions: Terrorist and Other
Organizations Subject to Government Censure
This section provides a working definition of terrorist organizations, and
then examines the similarities and the differences between terrorist or-
ganizations and other types of organizations subject to government cen-
sure. The main claim propounded here is that terrorist organizations, as
appropriately defined, cannot be treated merely as radical antigovern-
ment organizations (such as the Communist Party in the United States),
nor can they be treated merely as criminal organizations (such as the
Mafia).
Terrorism is usually defined in criminal codes as acts or threats of grave
violence against a person, or acts or threats of serious damage to property
(including essential services), that are intended to intimidate the public or to
compel a person, a government, or an organization to do or to refrain from
doing any act, and that are committed for a political, religious, or ideological
purpose, objective, or cause.' It is arguable (although not decisively) that
1. See, for example, the Canadian Criminal Code § 83.01(1); English Terrorism Act
2000 § I (as amended by the Terrorism Act 2oo6, ch. ut, § 34). There are also other, most-
ly wider definitions, such as the one found in section I of the Israeli Prevention of Terror-
ism Ordinance 1948, which refers to acts or threats of violence calculated to cause death or
injury to a person, and does not require any additional purposes, objectives, or causes.
Many other efforts to define terrorism have been made in various international forums
and in legal literature. See, for example, George P. Fletcher, The Indefinable Concept of
Terrorism, 4 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 894 (2oo6); Thomas Weigend, The Universal Terrorist,
4 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 912 (zoo6); Christian Walter, Defining Terrorism in National and
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where the imposition of criminal liability at very early stages (such as
joining an organization) is concerned, there is no place for including acts
of damaging property in the definition of terrorism. As we shall see, cre-
ating a fairly remote risk to interests of lesser importance such as property
would hardly seem sufficiently wrongful and blameworthy to justify
criminalization. If true, this principle can serve as one liability-limiting
principle.
Terrorist organizations are usually defined as organizations that commit
terrorist acts or have as their objective the commission of terrorist acts,2 as
well as "ancillary organizations" of various types, such as organizations act-
ing at the direction of, or in association with, such organizations, 3 organiza-
tions that encourage terrorism or are otherwise concerned with terrorism,4
or organizations that are indirectly engaged in assisting in or fostering
terrorist acts. 5 Such definitions also cover organizations that are not
engaged in the eventual commission of terrorist attacks (hereinafter: ancil-
lary organizations) and organizations that, in addition to their terrorist ac-
tivity, also have additional legitimate objectives (hereinafter: dual-purpose
organizations).
These definitions call for criticism due to over-breadth. As for ancillary
organizations, depending on their specific activity, their link to eventual
terrorist attacks can be tenuous; and thus membership therein is, as we
shall see in Part II, nothing more than a remote and indirect form of mere
potential complicity. In some cases it does not even rise to that level.
International Law, in Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security
Versus Liberty? 23 (Christian Walter et al. eds., zoo4); Mordechai Kremnitzer, Terrorism and
Democracy and the Case of Israel, 25 Hamishpat (2o8) (in Hebrew). See also Orna Ben-
Naftali & Yuval Shani, International Law Between War and Peace 287-9., esp. 290 (2007)
(in Hebrew).
There is no single formal definition of terrorism under international law. But see
Antonio Cassesse, The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law,
4 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 933, 935 (2oo6) (claiming that even though there is no formal defini-
tion of terrorism in international conventions, customary international law provides the
factual and mental elements of the crime of terrorism in time of peace. Disagreements con-
cern mainly the applicability of this definition in times of armed conflict, and particularly
whether it applies to acts of "freedom fighters" in wars of national liberation).
2. See, e.g., in England, Terrorism Act 2000 § 5; in Canada, Criminal Code § 83.0().
3. Canadian Criminal Code § 83.oS(b).
4. English Terrorism Act 2ooo § 3(5) (ch. s).
5. Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) § Io.I(1).
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Accordingly, there is no place for defining them as terrorist organizations
for our purposes.
As for dual-purpose organizations, whereas in certain contexts it may be
appropriate to declare them terrorist organizations (because of the unified
self-conception of such organizations, the potential difficulty in accurately
identifying distinct organizational units, and the need to delegitimize such
organizations), this is not the case in the context of the early imposition of
criminal liability. As will be further demonstrated in Part III, in this con-
text a broad definition can lead to the restriction of legitimate and even
desired civil activities such as nonviolent political expression or caring for
the welfare of deprived populations.
It is therefore suggested that only an organization the entire concerted
action of which is directed toward committing terrorist attacks should be
defined as a terrorist organization for our purposes. Terrorist organiza-
tions may be constructively differentiated according to several familiar
parameters. 6 One parameter is the capability and determination of the
organization to conduct terrorist attacks (with past attacks as the stron-
gest indication). Clearly, where the organization is not capable of, or
not determined to conduct terrorist attacks, it is impossible to attri-
bute such capability or determination to any of its members merely on
the basis of their association with the organization or even on the basis
of their participation in any of its activities. Another parameter is the
level of terrorist attacks the organization seeks to direct, with a possible
differentiation between large-scale terrorist schemes like those of
Al-Qaida and other, smaller-scale schemes. Considering the disastrous
effects of large-scale terrorism, it is easier to justify early criminalization.
In addition to terrorist organizations, the law can address dual-purpose
and ancillary organizations. As we shall see below, criminalization of
links to such organizations would be justifiable only in later stages of
activity.
The definition of terrorist organizations suggests certain proximity
between them and other types of organizations subject to government
censure. First, most terrorist organizations can be categorized as one type
of radical antigovernment organization: they are usually politically moti-
vated with the intention to compel the government to do or refrain
from doing any act. Clearly, this characteristic is less straightforward
6. Kremnitzer, supra note i.
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(or rather absent) where the terrorists' aim is, for example, to force private
cosmetics companies to avoid using animals for experimental purposes,
while at the same time to encourage the amendment of legislation. Yet,
since many terrorist organizations are indeed antigovernment, it is
essential to clarify their unique characteristics as a subcategory of such
organizations.
The main distinction between terrorist organizations (as defined above)
and other radical antigovernment organizations seems clear enough, at
least at first blush: unlike other organizations, terrorist organizations in-
tend to achieve their aims through violent attacks on life and limb (and
possibly also property) of members of the public. Yet, as the comparative
overview in Section C will demonstrate, the line between terrorist and
other organizations can be unjustifiably blurred by interested govern-
ments where, for example, an organization refers to the violent overthrow
of the government at some unknown point in the future. Clearly, the
broader the definition of a terrorist organization, the fuzzier the differen-
tiating line.
The risk of governments blurring the distinction between violent and
nonviolent organizations requires that even under a narrow definition
of a terrorist organization, terrorist organizations be treated with due
caution. Nevertheless, their violent methods of action do call for distinct
treatment. Although there is no justification for prohibiting any links
with nonviolent antigovernment organizations, certain such prohibitions
can be legitimately invoked with respect to terrorist antigovernment
organizations.
More complicated is the question of whether terrorist organizations should
not be treated as merely criminal organizations. Terrorist organizations-or
rather those branches of terrorist organizations that are engaged in terrorist
attacks-are indeed one type of criminal organization. They are the groups
that plan and execute criminal offenses.
Many jurisdictions have membership in criminal organizations as a gen-
eral offense, in addition to specific prohibitions addressing terrorist organ-
izations. For example: In Germany, § 129 of the Strafgesetzbuch, entitled
"Forming Criminal Organisations," addresses organizations whose aims or
activities are directed at the commission of offenses.' It imposes five years'
7. Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) Subsection 2(2) excludes cases in which the commission of
offenses is of merely minor significance for the objectives or activities of the organization.
MEMBERSHIP IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS | 231
imprisonment for forming such organizations, participating in them as
members, recruiting for them, or supporting them,8 with a minimum
sentence of six months' imprisonment for ringleaders, or where the case is
otherwise particularly serious.9 Article 416 of the Italian C6dice Penale, as
amended in 1982,10 is oriented toward Mafia-type associations and im-
poses a sentence of three to six years' imprisonment on anyone belonging
to such an association, with four to nine years' imprisonment for pro-
moters, managers, or directors of such an association; prison sentences are
lengthened in instances where someone in the association uses or threatens
to use weapons." In Canada, § 467.11 of the Criminal Code prohibits par-
ticipation in or contribution to any activity of a criminal organization.
The offense is punishable by five years' imprisonment. 12.13 The question
8. StGB Subsection i.
9. StGB Subsection 4.
to. The Italian Code of 1931 was entitled "Association for Purposes of Delinquency."
According to this article, the leaders and promoters of an association of three or more per-
sons aimed at committing more than one crime were subjected to three to seven years' im-
prisonment. Those who merely participated in such an organization were subjected to one
to five years' imprisonment. Punishment was increased if the number of persons associat-
ing was more than ten. See Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Conspiracy in Civil Law Countries,
42 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Pol. Sci. 171, 178-79 (1951); Herbert Wechsler et al., The
Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute:
Attempt, Solicitation and Conspiracy (Part II), 61(6) Colum. L. Rev. 957, 962 (1961).
it. Article 416 states that "(t) whoever is part of a Mafia-type conspiracy consisting of
three or more people is punishable with three to six years' imprisonment . . . (2) whoever
promotes or manages or directs such an association is punishable with four to nine years'
imprisonment. (3) . . . ." See also Michael Levi & Alaster Smith, A Comparative Analysis
of Organised Crime Conspiracy Legislation and Practice and Their Relevance to England
and Wales 9-10 (Home Office Online Report 17/2002).
12. The wording is as follows: "Every person who, for the purpose of enhancing the
ability of a criminal organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence . . . know-
ingly, by act or omission, participates in or contributes to any activity of the criminal or-
ganization is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years."
13. In the United States, prohibitions on association with criminals were highly com-
mon until the mid twentieth century. Offenses of vagrancy or disorderly conduct referred
mainly to association with "known thieves" or with prostitutes. The prohibition on associ-
ation with prostitutes is probably best explained on moralistic grounds. Some state courts
upheld the constitutionality of such offenses based on the theory that they were necessary
both to prevent persons from becoming public charges and to destroy breeding places of
crime. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 731, 191 S.E. 791, 111 A.L.R. 62 (1937). In
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), the Supreme Court found such a prohibition
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arises whether these prohibitions are sufficient for punishing membership
in terrorist organizations:
The differences, similarities, and ties between organized crime and
terrorism are too complicated to explore here, but it is worth briefly
highlighting a few key points. I shall start by suggesting that some differ-
ences between organized crime and terrorist organizations require a more
radical treatment of terrorist organizations:
First, unlike "simple" crime committed by organized groups, terror-
istic acts are committed "with the purpose to provoke a state of terror
in the general public . . . intimidate a population or compel a govern-
ment or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any
act."14 Thus the terrorist's aims and objectives manifest a particularly
strong antisocial position that pierces the heart of the sociolegal order as
such.' 5
Second, criminal organizations do not devote most of their energies to
offenses against the most important legal interests (life and bodily integrity),
but rather to pecuniary gain, as manifested in the delivery of illicit goods and
services, corruption, pornography, human trafficking, drug trafficking, gam-
bling, loan-sharking, racketeering, and money-laundering.' 6 In most cases,
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the American Constitution because of its alleged
vagueness and uncertainty. (The New Jersey Public Enemy Act § 4, ch. 155, 1934 N.J.
Laws, provided as follows: "Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to
be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at
least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime in
this or any other State, is declared to be a gangster. . . .") Similar decisions by State courts
preceded this decision: People v. Belcastro, 356 III. 144, 190 N.E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223
(1934); People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643, 250 N.W. 520 (1934). For the history of crimi-
nalization of association with criminals in the United States, see: David Fellman, Associa-
tion with Bad People, 22(4) J. Pol. 6zo (1960), and the references provided therein; Note,
Guilt by Association: Three Words in Search of a Meaning, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 148, 154-55
(1949). Today, criminal law focuses on association with more sophisticated organized crime
groups. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. %§ 1961-1968
(1970) [RICO] does not prohibit membership as such. The Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) prohibits engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.
14. United Nations Security Council Resolution Is66 (2004).
15. On the other hand, some acts that can be covered by the definition of terrorism,
such as justified acts of freedom fighters, have moral or at least understandable motives. See
Kremnitzer, supra note i.
16. See Michael D. Lyman & Gray W. Potter, Organized Crime 173-zo8 (4 th ed.
zoo6); Alexis Aronowitz, Trafficking in Human Beings: An International Perspective, in
Global Organized Crime: Trends and Developments 85 (Dina Siegel et al. eds., 2003);
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offenses involving bodily harm that are committed by criminal organiza-
tions do not have the general public as their target. Furthermore, some
(although definitely not all) acts or threats of terrorism are committed
on a significantly larger scale than any organized criminal activity. The
9/11 terrorist attack and threats of using biological, chemical, or atomic
weapons come to mind.
Third, the immediate environment in which the terrorists live and
function is often supportive of their agenda, and most terrorists conceive
of themselves as acting morally, are accordingly proud of their conduct,
and are willing to bear the consequences of their actions. In this respect
they psychologically resemble conscientious objectors rather than mem-
bers of an organized crime syndicate.' 7 Some terrorist groups such as the
Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany actually enjoyed public support, at
least at some stages of their operation.' 8 Accordingly, one can expect that
terrorists would be harder to deter.
Yet other differences require a more cautious treatment of terrorist or-
ganizations, or rather of ancillary and dual-purpose organizations. Certain
organizations that are 'terrorist' according to current definitions of the
term also work to assist minorities or otherwise deprived groups. In con-
trast, organized crime groups have exclusively economic objectives, and
their activities do not benefit the broader community in any way. More-
over, unlike crime groups, some terrorist organizations are also engaged in
radical, but legitimate political expression.
Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime 267-363 (9th ed. 2007); Alfred R. Lindesmith,
Organized Crime, 217 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 119, 123-27 (1941).
17. This is not in any way to say that the law should somehow take count of this self-
image.
18. See, for example, Peter H. Merkl, West-German Left Wing Terrorism, in Terror-
ism in Context, 16o, 208-9 (Martha Crenshaw ed., 1995): "Once the principals were in
jail, their notoriety and especially the hunger strikes helped them to raise a veritable ar-
my of real sympathizers. Many very young people joined the new Committees against
Isolation and Torture and extreme left wing groups willing to stage demonstrations and
propaganda campaigns in big cities. . . ." But see David A. Meier, Hooligans or Heroes?
(Book Review: Stefan Aust, Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F., transl.
Anthea Bell, 2009), H-Net Reviews in the Humanities & Social Sciences 1, 2 (Sept. 2009):
"The group's turn to violence caused public opinion to turn sharply against it, as bomb-
ings and bank robberies in the early 1970s generated a clear public demand for the
group's apprehension."
234 1 NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW VOL. 15 | NO. 2 | SPRING 2012
These latter differences are eliminated if terrorist organizations are
defined in a way that excludes ancillary and dual-purpose organizations, as
suggested above; whereas the other differences-those demanding more
radical treatment of terrorist organizations-might become less significant
were an organized criminal group to decide, for example, to attack and
take over an airport in order to import a massive amount of drugs into the
country, knowing that many civilians would be the victims of such an
attack.1 9 Random kidnapping and human trafficking by criminal organi-
zations also challenge this distinction. Furthermore, terrorist organizations
are themselves often engaged in typical organized-crime activities (such as
drug offenses) to fund their terrorist activities and, thus, are in close con-
tact with established organized crime groups. 20
Nevertheless, the unique characteristics that make terrorist organiza-
tions more dangerous and their acts more reprehensible never disappear
entirely, and accordingly the core concept of terrorist organizations is in-
deed distinguishable from the core concept of crime organizations.
B. The Interests Protected by Membership Offenses
This section traces the legal interests that prohibitions on membership in
terrorist organizations seek to protect. This investigation will allow us to
provide an accurate doctrinal account of these prohibitions in Part II of
the article, as well as to discuss their justifiability in Part III.
Various attempts have been made to provide a full account of protected
legal interests. 2' However, for purposes of this paper, full development of
19. Section zo(b) of the Israeli criminal code is one example of a legal rule that equates,
in terms of legal consequences, the mens rea of specific intent to cause a result and the
mens rea of knowing that this result is highly probable.
20. On the web of connections between terrorism and organized crime, see, e.g.,
Phil Williams, Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation or Trans-
formation, in Countering the Financing of Terrorism 126 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E.
Eckert eds., 2007); Tamara Makarenko, The Ties that Bind: Uncovering the Relationship
Between Organized Crime and Terrorism, in Global Organized Crime: Trends and Devel-
opments, supra note 16, at 159; Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, The Nexus
Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators and Organized Crime
Networks in Western Europe (2002), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope
NEXUS.pdf.
z. See Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative
Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 Duq. L. Rev. 345, 377-79, 413
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the concept does not seem necessary. Rather, it is sufficient to address the
core and uncontroversial legal interests that membership offenses protect,
and to touch upon other possible objects of protection while noting po-
tential difficulties.
Membership offenses are most reasonably viewed as inchoate offenses,22
ancillary to offenses constituted by actual terrorist attacks. As such, the
interests they protect are to be derived from these offenses. Common
definitions of terrorism imply that these interests include, most straight-
forwardly, life, bodily integrity, possibly also property, an aspect of state
sovereignty, that is, the state's capability to decide its actions without
illegitimate pressures being applied (implied by the requirement of inten-
tion to compel a state to do or refrain from doing any act), and possibly
also certain concrete aspects of general freedom of action (implied by the
common requirement of intent to compel a person to do or refrain from
doing any act).
Less straightforwardly appropriate to qualify as protected legal inter-
ests are the public's emotions23 implied by the requirement of intent to
intimidate the public. A mere offense to the public's emotions does not
seem to justify membership offenses. To justify criminalization, the
sense of an emotional offense must be justifiable (rather than idiosyn-
cratic). Joel Feinberg further suggests that the offense should be pro-
found and of a personal nature24 (and even then should not be
criminalized as a felony 25). Although justifiable, the emotional offense
at issue does not conform with Feinberg's additional characteristics.
Moreover, it is debatable whether emotional well-being qualifies as a
protected legal interest at all. 26
(1965-66); Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, 33, 61-6z (New York, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984). For Feinberg's related notion of harm, see especially 31-33; and for his notion of
offense, see Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others, i-2, 14-22 (1985).
zz. A different line of argument, according to which membership offenses are complete
offenses, will be introduced on page 237.
23. See, for example, Manuel Cancio Melii, The Wrongfulness of Crimes of Unlawful
Association, n New Crim. L. Rev. 563, 571-72 (zoo8).
24. Feinberg refers mainly to offenses that are intense, profound, personal, and spiteful
(his main example is the Nazis in Skokie case), and thus, according to his argument, lack
any social value. See Feinberg, Offense to Others, supra note 21, especially ch. u1, sect. 9.
25. See id. at 4.
26. It has been claimed that the emotions of most human beings can easily take a cer-
tain amount of disappointment (Nicholas J. Mullany & Peter R. Handford, Tort Liability
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Violating the public's ability to live an undisturbed day-to-day life and
enjoy general freedom of action provides a stronger justification for crim-
inalization. Yet the existence of an enforceable right for general liberty is
not consensual; 27 as far as this right has been protected under criminal
law, protection has focused on direct limitations on freedom of choice in
the form of threats to do, or refrain from doing, an action in response to
some act or omission by the victim (for example, the theoretically prob-
lematic, yet universally acknowledged, offense of extortion). More exten-
sive protection might have significant limiting effects on other people's
behavior and, in our case, on their fundamental liberties.
Another rationale for justifying criminalization is protecting democracy
and the entire web of individual interests guaranteed by democracy (and
in particular, the interest of general liberty).2 8 This latter interest might
well be threatened by a series of terrorist attacks culminating in the col-
lapse of the democratic regime. Accordingly, the risk is remote from any
specific attack, especially considering the fact that various additional
means are probably required to achieve such a collapse (such as substantial
military force or active, or at least passive, cooperation on the part of the
democratic state's armed forces). Furthermore, many terrorist groups do
not even seek such an outcome. Clearly, this course of development is
even more remote from membership offenses. It is also doubtful whether
such highly abstract concepts can fit within the framework of any desirable
definition of protected legal interests.
for Psychiatric Damage at 44-45 (ist ed. 1993); Feinberg, Offense to Others, supra note I,
at 3; Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 21, at 43); that the law should encourage re-
sponsibility for one's own emotional well-being rather than promote or validate undue sen-
sitivity (Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1035 (1936)); and that there are various practical considerations
against providing legal protection for emotions, such as the inability to prove and value
psychological injury, and the difficulty in proving a causal link between one person's be-
havior and another's emotional harm, mainly where the harm is remote (Mullany &
Handford, supra, at 43; W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, at 176-77 (16th
ed. zooz); John G. Fleming, The Law of Tort, at 173 (9th ed. 1998); Simon Deakin et al.,
Markensinis and Deakin's Tort Law, at 230-31 (5th ed. 2003). Mullany and Handford have
contradicted most of the practical considerations against recognition of psychological integ-
rity (supra, at 43-44).
27. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at ch. 12(1) (1978).
28. Shlomit Wallerstein, Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic
Activity, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. I, 24-25, 26 (2007).
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A different line of argument addresses membership offenses as complete
offenses: the mere existence of a terrorist organization creates fear and
distress to the general public. Here as well, the protected legal interest is
the public's emotional well-being, and to the extent that such fear disrupts
day-to-day conduct (for example, by deterring the public from using
public transport or by causing people to avoid crowded places), the inter-
est is also a general freedom of action and the right to live one's day-to-day
life undisturbed." But should these interests qualify as protected legal
interests, it should be noted that it would be more appropriate to impute
any effect on the public's emotions or freedom of action to the expected
terrorist attacks and not to the mere existence of the terrorist organization.
Having recognized the special characteristics of terrorist organizations
and the interests that they put at risk, we can progress to an examination
of the prohibitions on membership in such an organization. The next sec-
tion provides a short comparative overview. Following parts continue with
a doctrinal analysis and a normative evaluation, making use of the conclu-
sions reached up until this point.
C. Membership Offenses: A Brief Cross-Jurisdictional Overview
Many liberal democracies prohibit membership in terrorist organizations
or other links with such organizations. This section provides a short com-
parative introduction to the relevant modern prohibitions and implies the
potential danger of political persecution.
In the United States, organizations that allegedly had terrorist overtones
became the main target of government attack starting in the 1920S (together
with an expansion of the legislation pertaining to vagary).30 Yet criminal
29. On the combination of these two interests, see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
359-60 (2003).
30. Well known are the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 and the extreme governmental re-
sponse against communist activists. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2003). For limitations
of political associations in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century,
see John Lord O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61(4) Hary. L. Rev. 592,
esp. 602-5 (1948); Cole, supra, at 15-28. See also The Deportation and Exclusion Laws,
41 Stat. 1oo8 (1920), 8 U.S.C. %§ 137 (d), (e), and (g) (1940). Following Kessler v. Strecker,
307 U.S. 22, 30 (1939), where the Supreme Court interpreted the Act as requiring present
membership or affiliation, Congress amended the Act in 1940 to override this decision, and
past membership was made a specific ground for deportation. However, the American
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legislation was introduced only in 1940 by the well-known "Smith Act" (the
Alien Registration Act of 194031), which established specific conspiracy
offenses as well as a broad offense of membership in, or affiliation with, or-
ganizations that advocated the violent overthrow of the government. 32
These offenses were applied against members of the Communist
Party, even though its identification as a violent organization resembl-
ing terrorist organizations was dubious. The scope of this offense was
somewhat narrowed in the highly controversial 1961 Supreme Court de-
cision in Scales v. United States.33 Upholding the conviction of the
ex-communist Junius Scales, the U.S. Supreme Court regarded the
membership clause constitutional, while accepting the government's in-
terpretation of it as requiring active membership and intent to overthrow
the government by force. 34
"Active membership" is defined as participation in any of a wide pos-
sible range of the organization's activities (rather than only in a specific
terrorist enterprise). It is contrasted with "passive-nominal" member-
ship, which refers to mere registration that is not followed by participa-
tion in any of the organization's activities. Later in the article it is
submitted that this distinction is helpful and important, but insufficient
and nonexhaustive, as demonstrated by the objectionable conviction in
Scales. More precise definitions as well as further refinements are accord-
ingly proposed, drawing upon the different forms of conduct that may
constitute membership.
Supreme Court consistently narrowed the scope of this legislation. See Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945).
31. Alien Registration Act 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940) [hereinafter the Smith Act].
32. "Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such
society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof, shall be fined ... or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by
the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction." Id. at i9 U.S.C. § 2385.
33. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (596i).
34. It may be interesting to note that the U.S. Justice Department pursued this case
following two Supreme Court decisions that significantly restricted its ability to use the
Smith Act advocacy clause. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (concerning the
accessibility of evidence to defendants); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), 320
(requiring advocacy of action rather than advocacy of abstract doctrine).
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More relevant to our discussion are the modem American prohibitions. In
response to emerging Islamic terrorism, new prohibitions on the provision of
material support for terrorist organizations were legislated during the 199os.
The first prohibition, enacted in 1994, makes it an offense to provide material
support or resources, knowing or intending that they shall be used in prepa-
ration for, or in carrying out, a violation of various criminal prohibitions as-
sociated with terrorism. 35 The second prohibition, enacted in 1996, makes it
an offense to knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign ter-
rorist organization.36 "Material support" is defined expansively to include a
range of possible interactions with the organization-amongst other things,
the provision of any physical asset, transportation, lodging, communications
equipment, personnel, expert advice, or assistance. 37 The American prosecu-
tion has been using the material support clauses most frequently as catch-all
offenses, applying them to widely varying situations and stretching their inter-
pretation to the limit. 38 The most problematic interpretation proposed by the
prosecution to date has been of the prohibition on provision of personnel as
applying to providing oneself to the organization by way of assisting its
members.39 This interpretation was eventually rejected when the District Court
ruled that such a prohibition was unconstitutionally vague.40 Yet a recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision has rejected various constitutional challenges of the
material support provision, including claims of vagueness and violation of free-
dom of speech and freedom of association. 4 This decision did not adopt
claims made (perhaps somewhat too sweepingly) in legal literature, that "[tlhe
35. 18 U.S.C. § 23 39 A (2000 ed.).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 23 39 B (2000 ed.).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2339 A(b), defining material support or resources as currency or mone-
tary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other phys-
ical assets, except medicine or religious materials."
38. See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives
Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, i J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 5, 6-7,
16-17 (2005).
39. United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
40. Id.
41. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (decided June 21, 2010). The court has re-
jected the claim that it is unconstitutional to prohibit conducts such as training Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) members to use international law to resolve disputes peacefully, and
teaching PKK members to petition the United Nations and other representative bodies for
relief.
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material support law is a classic instance of guilt by association. It imposes
liability regardless of an individual's own intentions or purposes, based solely
on the individual's connection to others who have committed illegal acts."4 2
In Canada, as in the United States, passive-nominal membership in
terrorist organizations is not prohibited as such. Rather, § 83.18(1) of the
Canadian Criminal Code,4 3 entitled "Participation in Activity of Terrorist
Group," makes it a crime for anyone to "knowingly participat[e] in or
contribut[e] to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for
the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or
carry out a terrorist activity." According to § 83.18(3), participation or con-
tribution includes recruiting members, offering skills and services, entering
or remaining in a country at the behest of a terrorist group, or making
oneself available for the commission of a terrorist offense.
Nevertheless, it has been claimed here as well that the prohibition endan-
gers freedom of association, mainly in light of § 83.18(4), which directs the
court to consider, in reaching its decision, the defendant's use of words,
symbols, or other objects representing the group, his association with
persons who constitute the group, receiving benefits from a terrorist group,
and engagement in activities at the instruction of persons who constitute
the group.4 4 Furthermore, "the reference to facilitating the carrying out of
a terrorist activity .. . has been interpreted to include the broad definition of
facilitation in section 83.19(2), which does not require the accused to know
any particulars about the planned activity." 45 In addition, the definition of
terrorism under § 83.ol(a) includes inchoate forms of liability, which would
be in addition to crimes that are inchoate in substance. 4 6
Under recent United Kingdom law, 4 7 prohibitions usually apply to
"membership" without a detailed definition of the term. Four prohibitions
42. Cole, supra note 30, at so. It should be noted that in other jurisdictions supporting
a terrorist organization is an independent offense, distinct from membership in a terrorist
organization. See, e.g., English Terrorism Act, 2000, ch. it (Eng.) § 12; Israeli Prevention
of Terrorism Ordinance No. 33, 5708-1948, § 4, Official Gazette No. 24 (1948).
43. R.S.C., ch. C-4 6 (1985).
44. Id.
45. Kent Roach, Criminal Law 402 (4 th ed., 2009).
46. Id. at 405.
47. A historical example of prohibitions on association is the 1799 legislation entitled
"An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Societies established for Seditious and Trea-
sonable Purposes; and for Better Preventing Treasonable and Seditious Practices," 1799, 39
Geo, 3, ch. 79 (Eng.). This Act provided for the suppression and prohibition of societies
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have been legislated in the past century, two of which have already been
abolished. These include § 24 of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1922 (repealed in 1973);48 and more im-
portantly, § 19(i) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1973 (repealed in 19i). Interestingly, a 1978 decision by the Northern
Ireland Court of Appeal in the matter of Adams confined the scope of the
membership offense set by the last Act to cases in which the defendant
actively associated himself with the proscribed organization, as opposed to
cases of mere expression of support of the organization, its aims, or its
methods of action. 49 The prohibitions currently in force include § 21(a)
of The Emergency Provisions Act 1978,50 and %§ 11-13 of the Terrorism
Act 2000.51 They prohibit belonging to proscribed organizations (as well
as other links to such organizations). The compatibility of the 20oo Act
aiming to overturn the laws, government, or other civil or ecclesiastical establishment. It
further established strict regulations on printing presses and other means for publishing
discussions of public matters.
48. This section laid down a prohibition on becoming or remaining a member of an
unlawful association or doing any act with a view to promoting or calculated to promote
the object of an unlawful association or seditious conspiracy. It proscribed the following
associations: The Irish Republican Brotherhood, The Irish Republican Army, The Irish
Volunteers, The Cumann na m'Ban, and The Fianna na h'Eireann. Section I of the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Amending) (No. I) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1967
further deemed unlawful those organizations that were "at the date of this regulation or at
any time thereafter describing themselves as 'republican clubs' or any like organisation
howsoever described."
49. R v. Adams, [1978] 5 N.I.J.B.
50. Section z(c) of this Act further sets the offense of soliciting or inviting any person
to become a member of a proscribed organization.
51. Section ii(i) prohibits belonging or professing to belong to a proscribed organiza-
tion. Section 11(2) allows a defense where (a) the organization was not proscribed when he
became a member or began to profess to be a member, and (b) he has not taken part in the
activities of the organization at any time while it was proscribed.
Section 12 lays down the offense of inviting support other than provision of money or
property for a proscribed organization. It further lays down the offense of arranging, manag-
ing, or assisting in arranging or managing a meeting, knowing this meeting is to support a
proscribed organization, or to further the activities of a proscribed organization, or to be ad-
dressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organization. The of-
fenses under % it and 12 carry a maximum sentence of ten years' imprisonment and a fine.
According to § 13, a person in a public place commits an offense if he wears an item of
clothing, or wears, carries, or displays an article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to
arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization.
The maximum sentence is six months' imprisonment and a fine.
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with the Human Rights Act 1998 was challenged in R (On the Application
of the Kurdistan Workers' Party and Others) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department. 52 The Administrative Court refused to rule on the
issue, noting, with respect to the criminal prohibitions, that their interfer-
ence with individual rights protected by the European Convention should
be considered on the facts of each case as it arises. 53
Certain other jurisdictions follow British legal tradition and simply pro-
hibit membership in illegal or terrorist organizations as such, without leg-
islatively defining the term "membership." For example, Israel has no less
than four membership offenses with varying phrasings, burdens of proof,
and sanctions. The offenses are set by %§ 58 and 85 of The (Emergency)
Defence Regulations 1945, § 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
No. 3 of 5708-1948, and § 147 of the Israeli Criminal Code of 1977. The
Israeli Military Court of Appeal interpreted "membership" to include
passive-nominal membership.5 4  It further ruled that mere intention
to join an illegal organization is sufficient for conviction.5 5 Recently, the
Israeli Supreme Court has interpreted the term "membership of a terrorist
organization" in the context of the preventive arrest of "illegal combatants."
The Court made some effort to narrow the scope of this term, noting that
"it is insufficient to show any tenuous connection with a terrorist organiza-
tion in order to be included within the cycle of hostilities in the broad
meaning of this concept."56
52. [zooz] EWHC 644 (Admin.).
53. The Court stated as follows: "the question whether the regime of offences conse-
quential upon a lawful proscription gives rise to an unjustified interference with an individ-
ual's Convention rights needs to be considered on the particular facts of an individual case
as and when it arises. It should not be dealt with as an abstract or generalised issue.
Whether there is such an infringement will depend on all the circumstances of the individ-
ual case. Alternatively, any challenge should at the very least await the outcome of the
appeals to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. If the appeals succeed and
the claimant organisations are de-proscribed, the issue concerning penalties will fall away.
If they do not succeed, then consideration could be given to claims advanced at that time
on the basis of the circumstances then prevailing. Further, it is better that there should be
fresh claims at the right time, rather than adjourning the permission applications in respect
of the relevant parts of the present claims." Id., para. 91.
54. Appeal no. 7/68, Baransi v. The Military Prosecutor, Collection z, 62, at 67 (1968).
5. Appeal no. 8/70, Baransi v. The Military Prosecutor, Collection 3, 7, at 30 (1970).
56. Criminal Appeal 6659/o6 A. v. The State of Israel (in June zoo8), para. 21 of CJ
Beinisch's judgement.
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Australia (where associating with a member of a terrorist organization is
also an offense under certain conditions),57 Ireland,58 and India59 also
follow the English tradition of leaving the interpretation of the term
'membership' for the courts.
Continental jurisdictions provide a further insight into the various types of
prohibited links with terrorist organizations. In Germany, Strafgesetzbuch
%§ 127-129a address armed and terrorist associations.60 Section 127, entitled
"Forming Armed Groups," prohibits forming, commanding, and joining
armed groups, as well as providing them with weapons or money or otherwise
supporting them. Section 129a, entitled "Forming Terrorist Organisations,"
distinguishes amongst different types of terrorist organizations and several circles
of participants.61 Participants include the inner circle of ringleaders,62 a second
57. Section 102.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Austl.) prohibits membership
(maximum sentence: ten years' imprisonment). Section 102.8 sets the offense of associating
with a member of a terrorist organization, where the association provides support for the
organization, and the person intends that the support assist the organization to expand or
to continue to exist (maximum sentence: three years' imprisonment). Other offenses are
set by sections 102.2, 102.4-102.7 (with maximum penalties ranging between fifteen and
twenty-five years) include directing the activities of a terrorist organization, recruiting for
a terrorist organization, providing training to or receiving training from a terrorist organi-
zation, receiving funds from or making funds available for a terrorist organization, and pro-
viding support or resources to a terrorist organization.
58. Offences against the State Act 1939 § 21 (Act No. 13/1939) (Ire.) (maximum sen-
tence: two years' imprisonment).
59. Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 1s of zooz, § zo (repealed 2004) (maximum sen-
tence: ten years' imprisonment). For the current prohibition, see The Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Amendment Act, No. 29 of 2004, § 1o (maximum sentence: two years im-
prisonment and a fine).
6o. For an account of the complicated legislative history of these sections, see Till Gut,
German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof-BGH), 3rd Criminal Senate: Promot-
ing a Terrorist Organisation: Support versus Recruitment of Members or Supporters, 71(6)
J. Crim. L. 491 (2007).
61. Terrorist organizations are either organizations whose aims or activities are directed
at the commission of very grave offenses (subsection 1(1)-(2)), or organizations whose aims
or activities are directed at the commission of other less grave offenses that are intended for
specified terrorist objectives (such as seriously intimidating the population) (subsection 2;
the offenses are specified in subsections 1-5). According to subsection 3, when the organ-
ization's aims or activities are directed merely at threatening the commission of offenses,
the gravity of terrorist offencses is reduced.
62. Subsection 4 sets a sentence of three to ten years' imprisonment for ringleaders or
hintermen, unless the aims or activites of the group are directed merely at threatening the
commission of offenses, in which case the sentence is one to ten years' imprisonment.
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circle of other member-participants or people who otherwise form the
organization,6 3 the third circle of supporters,6 4 and last, the recruiters.6 5
To count as a member, it is not enough that a person merely join an orga-
nization. After joining, activity toward the terrorist objective must further
develop. Membership must be ongoing, and although there is no need for
regular, constant action, a hiatus in activity does not alter one's status as a
member.6 6
France has long-established prohibitions on membership in radical anti-
government organizations.6 7 The modern offense of criminal association
in relation to a terrorist undertaking (association de malfaiteurs en relation
avec une enterprise terroriste)68 was legislated in 1996 as part of France's
policy of aggressive prosecution of terrorist networks.6 9 The offense is de-
fined as "the participation in any group formed, or association established,
with a view to the preparation, marked by one or more material actions, of
any of the acts of terrorism provided for under the previous articles."7 0
Apparently, "[t]he vast majority of terrorism suspects are detained and
63. Subsections i and 2 set a sentence of one to ten years' imprisonment for other for-
mers or member-participants, unless the aims or activities of the group are directed merely
at threatening the commission of offenses, in which case subsection 3 sets a sentence of
six months' to five years' imprisonment.
64. Subsection 5 sets a sentence of six months' to ten years' imprisonment for support-
ers, unless the group was oriented only toward threatening, in which case the sentence is
not more than five years or a fine.
65. Subsection 5 sets a sentence of six months' to five years' imprisonment for whoever
recruits supporters or members for an organization whose aims or activities are directed to-
ward committing the listed offenses.
66. Adolf Schonke & Horst Schroder, Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar 1z82 (26th ed.
2oo6). German law further includes a special and controversial jurisdiction clause applying
these offenses to organizations abroad (StGB § 1z9 b).
67. Article 265 of the French Penal Code, as legislated in i8io, was aimed at associations
of criminals formed after the 1789 Revolution. After their disappearance at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, and with the activities of anarchist at its prime focus, the wording
of the prohibition was changed in 1893 include "any established association, . . . any agree-
ment entered into with the purpose of preparing or perpetrating crimes against individuals
or things." Wagner, supra note io, at 174-75.
68. The offense was introduced by Law No. 96-647 ofJuly 22, 1996, Journal Officiel de
la R6publique Franeaise [J.0.] [Official Gazette of France], July 23, 1996.
69. Human Rights Watch, Preempting Justice: Counterterrorism Laws and Procedures
in France (I July 2008) [hereinafter Preempting Justice].
70. Article 421-2-1 of the Code p6nal.
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prosecuted on this charge." 7' On some occasions massive preventative
arrests were conducted, with the offense used as a legal platform. 72 Only
very slight evidence of contact between people is required to obtain judi-
cial detention warrants.7 3 Related offenses include leading or organizing
terrorist associations, and aggravated forms are established where the asso-
ciation's purposes are especially dangerous.7 4
It may be concluded that membership offenses are common, that they
often (though not always) cover mere registration as a member, and that
they cause inconvenience and legal disquiet in many jurisdictions.
II. MEMBERSHIP OFFENSES EXPAND THE SCOPE OF
CRIMINAL LAW
This part provides a doctrinal analysis of prohibitions on membership in
terrorist organizations. It explores the way in which these prohibitions
expand the scope of well-established doctrines of criminal law. Based on
the analysis proposed in this part, the justifiability of the expansion will be
examined in Part III.
A. Membership Offenses are "Relatives" of Conspiracy Doctrine
This section compares membership offenses and the conspiracy doctrine.
This comparison opens the door for a subsequent analysis of membership
offenses as expansions of attempt law and to some extent also of complicity
law, much like conspiracy doctrine.
71. Preempting Justice, supra note 69, part III (referring to Ministry of Justice statistics,
as reported in Piotr Smolar, Les prisons francaises comptent 358 detenus pour activisme,
Le Monde (Paris), September 9, 2005).
72. Preempting Justice, supra note 69, at i.
73. Id. at 13-14.
74. These include willful attacks on life; willful attacks on the physical integrity of per-
sons; abduction and unlawful detention; hijacking of planes, vessels, or any other means of
transport; attacks with explosives or fire in places and at times where such attacks are likely
to cause the death of one or more persons; or the introduction into the atmosphere, the
ground, waters, foodstuffs, or ingredients of any substance liable to cause the death of one
or more persons. The aggravated offense was introduced in 2006 by Law No. 2oo6-64 of
January 23, zoo6, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Franeaise [JO.] [Official Gazette of
France], January 24, 2oo6.
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Criminal law usually prohibits the commission of offenses, attempts to
commit offenses, and complicity (which includes motivating the perpetra-
tor into action as well as aiding the commission of an offense). Apart from
that, some preparatory acts that are not sufficient for establishing a crimi-
nal attempt are specifically and exceptionally prohibited.
Anglo-American jurisdictions further criminalize conspiracy to commit
an offense. Clearly, the offense of conspiracy developed differently in each
of the Anglo-American jurisdictions. However, certain commonalities may
be traced, and for the sake of brevity, I shall concentrate on these common-
alities while spotlighting England and the United States. The history of
the conspiracy doctrine can be very briefly (and somewhat simplistically)
described as follows: The early English common law offense of conspiracy
prohibited a combination of two or more persons to do or accomplish either
an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.7 5 This definition was in
use in other common law countries, as well as in countries that drew inspi-
ration from the common law (such as the United States). Both in and out-
side England, the definition was criticized as exceptionally broad in terms
both of the conspiratorial object and of the essence of the conspiratorial re-
lationship.76 In the United States it was further criticized as extremely
vague.7 7 Criticism brought about legal reform: Following developments in
75. See Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of
Individual Defendants, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 277 (1948) and the references therein;
Mordechai Kremnitzer, Criminal Conspiracy and Its Relation to Criminal Solicitation,
14 Mishpatim 231, 233-34 (1985) (in Hebrew). For the development of the common law of
conspiracy, see also Percy Henry Winfield, The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal
Procedure 112-30 (2001 [19211).
76. The conspiratorial relationship included at least an agreement between intended
perpetrators, an agreement between an intended perpetrator and an intended aider, and
possibly also a combination of an intended perpetrator and a person who wants the offense
to be committed but does not intend to take any part in its commission. Kremnitzer, supra
note 75, at 235. For the controversy around the aims of conspiracy, see P. Gillies, Law of
Criminal Conspiracy in Australia and England, 8 Sydney L. Rev. 107 (1977).
77. For example, American courts defined the nature of the conspiratorial relationship in
various manners including "an agreement," "an implied agreement" that might be established
by fictional components, "a partnership in criminal purposes," and "a combination," the
nature of each was not particularly clear. See Herbert Wechsler et al., supra note so, at
977-78. See also Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Cal. L. Rev.
1137 n.17 (1973). For a detailed account of American courts' definitions, see Theodore W.
Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 Va. L. Rev. 898 (1939). At least at some
stages it was unclear whether mere knowledge of the conspired act, as distinguished from
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common law,7 8 the modern English definition now refers to an agreement
where one or more parties to the agreement would (attempt to) commit an
offense, accompanied by intent or knowledge regarding the facts or circum-
stances necessary for the commission of the offense.79 The American Model
Penal Code definition confines "conspiracy" primarily to agreements to
commit, attempt, solicit, or aid the commission of a crime, with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission.8 0 Significantly, the
purpose requirement was considered crucial, in accordance with the parallel
requirement governing the law of complicity (as well as the law of attempt).
It was "necessitated by the extremely preparatory behavior that may
be involved in conspiracy," 8 ' demonstrating that the perpetrator made
the venture his own and had a stake in its outcome. 82 The purpose require-
ment was explicitly meant to exclude criminal liability based on mere
passive-nominal membership in organizations with both legal and illegal
purposes.
purpose, was sufficient for establishing criminal responsibility. See Cousens, id. at 970. This
vagueness had led courts and commentators to assert that "the modern crime of conspiracy is
so vague that it almost defies definition" (Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 44o, 446
(949), cited by Wechsler et al., supra note so, at 967), and that "no intelligible definition of
conspiracy has yet been established" (Wright, The Law of Criminal Conspiracies and Agree-
ments (1887), cited by Wechsler et al., supra note to, at 967).
78. For a detailed description of these developments, see Peter Gillies, The Law of
Criminal Conspiracy (2nd ed. 1990).
79. Section i(i) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 refers to "[an agreement] with any other
person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which . . . either (a) will nec-
essarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by one or more of
the parties to the agreement, or (b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render
the commission of the offence or any of the offences impossible." Subsection 2 adds a re-
quirement that the conspirators intend or know that all of the facts or circumstances nec-
essary for the commission of the offense shall or will exist when the prohibited conduct
takes place.
8o. The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Complete Statutory Text (Official
Draft and Explanatory Notes), § 5.03 (1985). The prohibition on agreement to provide aid
was very broad, referring to provision of aid in the planning or commission of a crime as
well as aid in the planning or commission of an attempt or solicitation to commit a crime.
81. Wechsler et al., supra note 1o, at 971.
8z. See Judge Learned Hand's opinion with regard to the purpose requirement in con-
spiracy and abetting cases in United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940),
affd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
83. Wechsler et al., supra note to.
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In continental Europe the concept of conspiracy has traditionally been
more limited in scope (the elements are strictly defined) and in application
(only conspiracy to commit grave offenses has been prohibited). At the
heart of the traditional continental concept of conspiracy was the existence
of a criminal organization. Yet, despite long-lasting suspicion, some
continental jurisdictions have adopted a general offense of conspiracy to
commit a crime, 87 integrating the modern Anglo-American emphasis on
agreement.8 8 In some jurisdictions there seems to be no strict purpose re-
quirement.8 9
As far as unified doctrines of conspiracy and membership offenses may
be traced, many of their core characteristics are similar, and such similarity
is most remarkable where the object of comparison is the traditional com-
mon law conspiracy. As with conspiracy, membership refers to a prohibited
relationship between the perpetrator and others. The underlying assump-
tion is that the prohibited relationship is directed toward an illegitimate
future conduct, and this conduct should be prevented by way of early inter-
vention. Similar to the traditional common law definition of the conspira-
torial relationship, the essence of membership relations is hardly fixed and
84. Wagner, supra note ro.
85. The Italian prohibition on association-with its reference to multiple participant
groups aiming at the commission of multiple offenses, and with its distinctions between
different organizations and different participants-is often introduced as the classic exam-
ple of continental conspiracy doctrine. Wechsler et al., supra note to, at 962; Wagner,
supra note to, at 178.
86. Wagner, supra note to, at 171 and 175-77.
87. In Germany, StGB §§ 30-31 establish a general conspiracy doctrine (notably,
§ 30(2) refers to "a person who declares his willingness or who accepts the offer of another
or who agrees with another to commit or abet the commission of a felony"). Felonies are
defined in § 12 as acts punishable by a minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment.
In France, the general conspiracy offense is set by the Code p6nal, Book IV (Felonies and
Misdemeanours against the Nation, the State and the Public Peace), Title V (Participation in a
Criminal Association). According to article 450-1, "a criminal association consists of any group
formed or any conspiracy established with a view to the preparation, marked by one or more
material actions, of one or more felonies, or of one or more misdemeanours punished by at
least five years imprisonment."
88. German law provides a good example. See StGB, supra note 87.
89. French law mentions merely that the conspiracy should be established with "a view
for the preparation" of felonies. See Code p6nal, supra note 87. The German prohibition
does not expressly mention an intent requirement, but some form of intent is nevertheless
required. See Schonke & Schroder, supra note 66, at 571.
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accurate, and accordingly, may be constituted by various forms of conduct
(thus, generating a possible overlap of the prohibitions)."o
Yet, nonetheless, some differences are obvious. The aim of the follow-
ing discussion is merely to highlight these differences, although under cer-
tain conditions their relevance to the normative discussion conducted in
Part III is implied.
Many of the differences between membership offenses and conspiracy
doctrine emphasize the broader applicability of the former over the latter.
In terms of the mental element, most membership offenses require mere
knowledge of the fact that the group's purpose is directed toward terrorist
acts, 9 1 whereas many (although not all9 2) conspiracy doctrines are
purpose-centerd, and are thus intentionally narrower than membership of-
fenses.9 3 It is thus harder to rely on the actor's strong culpability to justify
criminalization of membership. As for the factual element: The reference
to an agreement in modern conspiracy doctrines is clearer and narrower
than undefined references to "membership," thus ensuring a higher level
of determination. Moreover, unlike most membership offenses,9 4 some
conspiracy doctrines require one or more of the conspirators to have per-
formed some overt act in furtherance of the criminal agreement,9 5 thus
demonstrating dangerousness and determination. In addition, whereas
conspiracy is constituted by a momentary act (agreement or consent),
90. The line can be roughly drawn at the consumption of knowledge regarding the
commission of offenses: once a member is exposed even to the most general knowledge re-
garding criminal activity, he would in many cases also be considered a conspirator.
95. The American membership offense set by the Smith Act, as it was interpreted in
Scales, supra note 33, is an exception. The current Canadian prohibition set in Canadian
Criminal Code § 83.18(0) (which according to some claims resembles membership offenses)
requires an aim to enhance the organization's ability to commit offenses. This requirement
comes close to a requirement of an aim that offenses be committed.
92. See Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma, supra note 75, at 279, 281-82; Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (r947); The English Criminal Law Act 1977, ch. 45, § 1(2).
93. Model Penal Code, supra note 8o.
94. The French membership offense, which requires the commission of an overt action,
is an exception; see Part I, Section A.
95. Yet it has been noted that "this additional requirement adds little. Practically any act
will do, including seemingly innocent conduct that carries the conspiracy no closer to accom-
plishing its object than the agreement itself Moreover, an act by one alleged conspirator
suffices for all." Johnson, supra note 77, at 1142. See also Note, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, 79 Yale L.J. 872, 878 (1970), and the references therein; George P. Fletcher,
Rethinking Criminal Law at 224 (wooo).
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membership is, in some cases, a continuing situational offense whose
commission continues until the actor does an act that "terminates" his or
her membership.
In other respects, membership offenses are narrower than conspiracy
doctrine, and are accordingly easier to justify. Unlike conspiracy, member-
ship offenses have often had only the commission of grave crimes (in con-
tinental jurisdictions, usually more than one9 ) as their object.9  Thus, as
we shall see in Part III, the gravity of the expected harm may justify mem-
bership offenses even more than it may justify the conspiracy doctrine. In
addition, for the purposes of conspiracy, it is usually unimportant with
whom or with how many people the perpetrator conspires.9 8 For purposes
of membership offenses, the perpetrator must join an organization, that is,
an already existing group of at least several people.99 Chances of success
are therefore higher. Furthermore, this organization must be characterized
as a terrorist organization. Considering the motives and objectives of ter-
rorist organizations, membership can demonstrate a relatively high level of
determination.
To conclude, there seem to be close similarities between membership of-
fenses and conspiracy offenses, with membership offenses being more inclu-
sive mainly with respect to the mental element and the exact nature of the
prohibited conduct (and with conspiracy offenses being more inclusive
mainly with respect to the identity of the coconspirators). Legal literature
on traditional continental law does not distinguish conspiracy offenses from
96. Modern French antiterrorism offenses that require that the organization be directed
at the commission of any terrorist act are an interesting development; see Part 1, Section A.
97. Current German prohibitions provide an example; see above, Part 1, Section A.
98. The old continental conception of conspiracy as a prohibition on organization is
different, but this conception gradually disappears even from continental legislation.
99. Melii, supra note 23, at 581, and the references therein. Article 2 of Framework
Decision zooz/ 4 7 5/JHA (June 13, 2002) of the Council of the European Union on com-
bating terrorism does contain some structural requirements. It defines a terrorist group as
follows: "a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time
and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. 'Structured group' shall mean a group
that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does
not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or
a developed structure." However, together with the changing structure of terrorist organ-
izations-from hierarchical, well-structured organizations to horizontal cells connected
loosely-this requirement is being relaxed.
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membership offenses.' 0 0 The ties between the modern Anglo-American
concept of conspiracy and the concept of membershiplo have been
observed by the U.S. Supreme Court and more explicitly in the relevant
legal literature.10 2 Considering those ties and similarities, it is not surprising
that both conspiracy doctrine and membership offenses have been used for
political persecution.103
The similarities and differences between the doctrines can be of assistance
both in analyzing membership offenses and in evaluating their justifiability.
B. Are Membership Offenses Expansions of Attempt Law or of
the Doctrine of Complicity?
Section A compared membership offenses and conspiracy doctrine, empha-
sizing the similarities between the two. This section analyzes membership
offenses as expansions of attempt law and possibly also of complicity doc-
trines, on the basis of their similarities with conspiracy doctrine. Having
come to the conclusion that membership offenses expand the scope of these
doctrines, an examination of the justifiability of this expansion will follow.
Conspiracy doctrine is in itself a hybrid, broadening the scope of crim-
inal attempt on the one hand, and the scope of criminal complicity on the
other. 0 4
ioo. Wagner, supra note 10, e.g., 178; Wechsler et al., supra note 1o, at 962;
Kremntizer, supra note 75, at 233. The linkage between conspiracy and membership
offenses is easily demonstrated when observing, for example, the French prohibition of
1893, which addressed both associations and agreements directed toward commission of
crimes (French Penal Code, supra note 67), thus encompassing a wide net of relationships
including the narrowest and clearest form of conspiratorial relationships-the agreement to
commit a crime.
ioi. In the United States, for example, legislation of the Smith Act membership of-
fenses as well as of its specific conspiracy offenses was nourished mainly by frustration re-
garding the practical limitations of federal conspiracy law. Mark A. Sheft, The End of the
Smith Act Era: A Legal and Historical Analysis of Scales v. United States, 36 Am. J. Legal
Hist. i64, 166 (1992).
102. See, e.g., Wechsler et al., supra note io, at 969; Sheft, supra note ioi, at 166-67,
187; Scales, supra note 33, at 229: Abrams, supra note 38, at 29-30.
103. For concrete examples see Johnson, supra note 77, at i139, 1153; Note, Conspiracy
and the First Amendment, supra note 95. See also dissenting opinion at Epton v.
New York, 390 U.S. 29, 32 (1968).
104. For a more comprehensive argument demonstrating that conspiracy is an inchoate
crime rather than a complete crime, see Kremnitzer, supra note 75, at 236-41.
252 NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I VOL. 15 | NO. 2 SPRING 2012
One aspect of conspiracy, arguably its main aspect, is that of criminal
preparation, that is, taking preparatory steps toward the commission of an
offense, steps that are usually not punishable because of their remoteness
from the commission of the offense and the resulting harm.' 05 It is easy
to see how the scenario of agreements among potential perpetrators who
intend to commit an offense has been considered a form of preparation.
Such agreements create objective grounds for future cooperation in com-
mitting an offense.1 0 6 By punishing preparation, conspiracy broadens the
scope of criminal attempt.' 0 7
It is more difficult to reach a definitive conclusion about the preparatory
nature of membership. The nature of the conduct that may constitute the
status of a member affects its possible characterization as preparation. As for
passive-nominal membership: On the one hand, joining an already estab-
lished group brings the perpetrator closer to the commission of an offense
than does an agreement amongst unorganized persons. Where the group is
already established, the criminal infrastructure already exists, and thus com-
mission of the offense is easier and more inviting. On the other hand, espe-
cially where ancillary and dual-purpose organizations are at issue, the mere
fact of membership in a group does not automatically imply an intention to
commit a criminal offense, nor does the fact of membership automatically as-
sign the member a specific role in the commission of a terrorist attack. Even
where the organization is exclusively terrorist in nature, the absence of more
or less fixed modes of action (for example, suicide bombing) can make it hard
to regard passive-nominal membership as preparatory. The degree of destruc-
tiveness can also affect the identification of preparation: when an organization
targets property, we might be less inclined to identify preparation for reasons
that are further discussed in Part III. Leaving passive-nominal membership
aside, more active conduct may very well have a clearer preparatory nature.
Learning how to operate weapons is an obvious example. Where membership
takes such a form, the nature of the organization is of lesser importance.
Yet it should be kept in mind that the mens rea of most membership
offenses distances these offenses from the realm of criminal attempts, which
in the Anglo-American world are characterized by an intention to commit
the offense. Most membership offenses do not require even knowledge of a
105. Id. at 239.
io6. Id. at 238-39.
107. Johnson, supra note 77, at 1141-42.
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specific planned offense, let alone the intention to participate in its
commission. All that membership offenses require is that the perpetrator
knows that the organization has the general aim of committing a grave offense.
A second aspect of conspiracy, and accordingly of membership offenses, is
that of complicity: inducement or solicitation to the commission of an offense
or aiding and abetting its commission. In the typical case of conspirators
who intend to commit an offense jointly, the initiator solicits the other(s) to
commit the offense.108 More peripheral cases would usually establish mere
spiritual aid.' 09 Where the coconspirator does not reach a final decision to
commit the offense, or when the offense whose commission is meant to be
aided is neither committed nor attempted, conspiracy doctrine criminalizes
merely attempted complicity.
Membership offenses can be similarly analyzed as expanding the scope
of criminal complicity.'"o But here, the typical case would be close in
essence to (attempted) aid, and only peripheral cases would be of (attempted)
solicitation.
With respect to (attempted) solicitation, membership in large organiza-
tions can perhaps have a soliciting effect. Here, the relevant arena is not
usually one of simple criminal solicitation, but rather of incitement to ter-
rorist offenses (as a special and broad form of solicitation): the fact of a
person's membership in a terrorist organization can perhaps encourage
other unspecified members of the organization to decide to participate in
terrorist attacks. This can be either in those rather rare cases where the
member in question holds a special spiritual position in relation to other
members, or in the more common case, where the mere fact of a large
membership base encourages potential terrorists and drives them into ac-
tion. Notably, the mere fact of membership does not itself project any in-
dependent inciting content (such as a call for violence), and the soliciting
effect exists only in conjunction with other memberships.
More plausibly, membership should be analyzed with reference to
(attempted) aid doctrines. Here there is a reason to distinguish passive-
nominal membership from active membership. Passive-nominal member-
ship can perhaps be said to aid physically in the commission of terrorist
attacks, assuming that the members form the infrastructure of the whole
io8. Kremnitzer, supra note 75, at 245.
109. Id. at z46, esp. n.63.
ino. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 33, at 227.
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terrorist mechanism." In other words, without a basis of (silent, support-
ive) members, the organization would simply not be able to operate. Yet,
such an assumption seems too speculative; and even if it is valid, a single
member's conduct is rather ineffectual in its antisocial nature and gains its
ultimate force only in conjunction with other similar conduct. Otherwise,
passive membership might spiritually aid potential perpetrators of terrorist
offenses: knowing that there is a basis of members would probably reas-
sure the perpetrators.
When membership is defined as active participation, the (attempted)
aid may very well be physical. It is in this light that Norman Abrams has
suggested analyzing current American material support offenses.112 But
even where membership is so defined, it is necessary to examine the mem-
bership's exact manifestation, especially where ancillary and dual-purpose
organizations are concerned. Not every form of active participation in the
organization's activities can be regarded as a form of (potential) criminal
aid. While participation in terrorist activities does qualify as aid, participa-
tion in civil activities does not. It is hard to accept the position shared by
various authorsll 3 and accepted by the Israeli Supreme Courti14 that
participation in civil and terrorist branches are one and the same thing.
Although funding of terrorism raises specific difficulties in this regard,' '5 the
objects of other concrete acts of aid can surely be identified as civil or terrorist.
Civil activities that as a by-product increase popular support, which in turn
merely provides spiritual aid for terrorists, cannot qualify as (potential) aid.
in. BSH'P 6552/05 Abidat v. The State of Israel [17.8.05] TakSC 2005(3) 2120.
uz. Abrams, supra note 38, at 18.
113. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy
After September n1, [2002] Utah L. Rev. 481, 506-7 (zooz); Matthew Levitt, Stemming the
Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 27 Fletcher F. World
Aff. 59, 64-66 (2003).
114. Abidat, supra note in, at zzo. The Court goes on to say: "The civil function nour-
ishes the military objective, and the military objective provides the cause for and objective
of the monetary-civil activity and the provision of funding needed for the organisation's
activity, including helping people in need and conducting social activities for young mem-
bers in order to encourage their participation and membership in the organisation."
15. The main claim here is that there is no possibility of cutting off funding to terrorist
activities without cutting off funding for civil activities (which would otherwise be directed
to terrorist activities). See for example, Robert M. Chesney, Review: Civil Liberties and the
Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique, ioi Mich. L. Rev.
1408, 1447 (2003). For criticism of these claims, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism, 62-63 (2003).
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As far as membership offenses criminalize such activities, they expand the
scope of aid doctrine.
This expansion comes in addition to other, more general expansions of
liability: first, membership offenses expand liability to cases in which the
eventual offense has not been committed or attempted. Membership of-
fenses further expand the scope of complicity doctrines by the minimal
mens rea requirement that does not include a purpose to aid, or even
knowledge that the fact of membership might aid the commission of an
offense, nor does it require a purpose that the offense be committed or
even knowledge of a particular planned offense.
Considering the abandonment of both central actus reus requirements
and central mens rea requirements of complicity doctrines, as well as the
fact that the contribution of members to the commission of offenses is
usually slight (in the main, a vague and indirect form of spiritual aid), the
question arises of whether there remains any real nexus between member-
ship offenses and complicity doctrines.
Based on its similarities to conspiracy doctrine, this part of the article
has demonstrated that prohibitions on membership in terrorist organiza-
tions criminalize a broad range of conduct, some of which is preparatory
or pre-preparatory (thus expanding the scope of attempt law), whereas
other conduct maintains some loose connection to soliciting conduct or
aiding conduct (thus expanding the scope of complicity doctrine). The
next part of the article examines whether expanding the scope of criminal
law to cover this conduct is justifiable. The examination draws upon many
of the justifications for conspiracy doctrine, as far as they are applicable to
membership offenses, as well as upon criticism of conspiracy doctrine. It
further proposes particular considerations for and against criminalization.
Ill. IS THE EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL LAW JUSTIFIABLE?
To examine the justifiability of expanding criminal law as described in Part II,
this section builds upon two main distinctions: The primary distinction is
between exclusively terrorist organizations on the one hand, and ancillary and
dual-purpose organizations on the other hand, as outlined in the definition of
terrorism proposed in Part 1. This distinction allows us to identify those organ-
izations that most closely resemble conspiracies and examine the justifiability
of criminalizing membership therein on similar lines as those of conspiracy.
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The secondary distinction, also introduced in Part I, is between passive
membership and active membership. As explained above, passive member-
ship means mere affiliation to the organization. The crudest form of pas-
sive membership, also termed "passive-nominal membership," refers to
joining an organization, but neglecting to take any part in its activities.
Active membership refers to taking part in different activities of the orga-
nization (there is no need for any preceding act to symbolize joining the
organization). Obviously, the last distinction is hardly clear-cut. Rather,
different forms of membership can be categorized as tending more toward
passive participation or more toward active participation, and various con-
siderations affect the categorization. Furthermore, additional distinctions
are required to properly evaluate membership offenses and delineate their
legitimate scope. Yet for purposes of simplicity, this part begins by discus-
sing passive in contrast to active membership.
The two above-mentioned distinctions would help in examining how
far criminal law can be justifiably expanded. They have been selected for
the following reason: To identify the legitimate scope of criminalization,
it is necessary to evaluate the different possible links between members
and terrorist organizations according to two variants: the risk they cause
(as acts of preparation and possibly as acts of attempted complicity) and
their value as exercises of fundamental constitutional rights. For this pur-
pose, the roles members take in the terrorist scheme can be arranged accord-
ing to different combinations of three pairs of parameters: passivity /
activity; civil orientation / orientation toward dangerous activity; lack of
legitimate expressive purposes / existence of legitimate expressive purposes.
These chosen distinctions manifest combinations of these three parameters
(as will become clearer in course of the analysis); and they also manifest,
to some extent, the doctrinal differentiation between acts of preparation
and acts of attempted complicity, which adds yet another dimension to the
evaluation.
Section A demonstrates that when it comes to exclusively terrorist organ-
izations, and especially to exclusively terrorist organizations that are also
highly destructive, there is sufficient justification for criminalizing both pas-
sive membership (subject to certain limitations) and active membership.
Referring to von Hirsch's notion of remote risk, and relying on various jus-
tifications for modern conspiracy doctrine, it is demonstrated that, in such a
case, the risk of terrorist attacks can be fairly attributed not only to the ac-
tive member, but also to the passive member, under certain conditions.
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Section B discusses ancillary and dual-purpose organizations. Where
such organizations are concerned, conspiracy doctrine and membership of-
fenses diverge along separate paths, and there is no sufficient justification
for attributing the risk to the passive member. Accordingly, it may be ar-
gued that there are strong reasons for criminalizing certain forms of active
membership while avoiding criminalization of passive membership.
The essential fine-tuning of the distinction between passive and active
membership, as well as the development of additional distinctions among
different types of active participation, are the subject of Section C.
Section D discusses the mens rea of the proposed prohibitions.
A. Membership in Exclusively Terrorist Organizations
The first issue is the justifiability of prohibitions on passive-nominal mem-
bership in exclusively terrorist organizations. Having come to the conclu-
sion that such prohibitions are justifiable, the justification for prohibiting
active membership in such organizations is almost self-evident. Yet, it is
claimed in the last part of this section that criminalization should not ap-
ply to all forms of membership, passive and active, under a single general
prohibition on membership. Rather, different forms of conduct should be
addressed by separate and specific prohibitions.
As demonstrated in Part II, passive membership mainly extends the
realm of attempt doctrine, although in certain cases, it also extends the
realm of complicity. Accordingly, where a member joins subsequent to a
terrorist attack, and there are no other potential attacks on the horizon,
criminalization can hardly be justified. Clearly, preparation and solicita-
tion offenses are out of the question; nor can such membership be con-
ceived as aid after commission (which could consist of helping the
terrorists to escape, for example). But where a member joins prior to an
attack, an argument for criminalization can be made. Although it is possi-
ble to claim that membership does not reflect the same commitment as an
agreement to commit a crime, membership is, at the very least, a declara-
tion of willingness to move forward and commit, or take part in the com-
mission of, a terrorist attack; and it exposes the member to pressures by
other members and superiors directed at causing his involvement in the
commission of such an attack, thus increasing the risk of an eventual
harm. The question then becomes whether this forms sufficient ground
for criminalization.
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This question should be analyzed using what Andrew von Hirsch terms
"remote harm" or "remote risk" doctrines."' Von Hirsch refers to the
criminalization of conduct creating "risks that are remote in the sense that
they involve certain kinds of contingencies," 117 and enumerates situations
of abstract endangerment, yet-expected intervening choices, and resulting
accumulative harms as qualifying under this definition." 8 As with con-
spiracy, membership offenses generally meet the criteria of the yet-
expected intervening choices category: conduct that is "thought to induce
or lead to further acts (by the defendant or a third person) that create or
risk harm."119 The main question raised by von Hirsch is, under what
circumstances can the eventual harm be fairly imputed to the conduct at
issue?' 20
In response, von Hirsch begins by comparing legal causality doctrines
and remote harm doctrine, concluding that legal causation doctrines
should not be imported, but rather examined to see how they can be sug-
gestive for developing imputation principles.12 1 The same can be said with
respect to other general doctrines of criminal law that address contingen-
cies, mainly aid doctrine (where the harm is caused by another person, and
the actor is charged with responsibility for her contribution to its occur-
rence), as well as certain attempt or solicitation doctrines that resemble re-
mote harm doctrine in terms of the probability of the expected harm, and
differ from it only in its remoteness. Thus, these doctrines should be kept
in mind when considering criminalization of membership.
116. See Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: "Remote" Harms and Fair
Imputation, in Harm and Culpability 259 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
117. Id. at 263.
nS. Id. at 263-65.
n19. Id. at 264.
120. Von Hirsch discusses this question; see supra note u6, 265. It may be worthwhile
to mention the two assumptions underlying the discussion of remote harm and fair impu-
tation: first, that criminal law has a preventative purpose-see Andrew Ashworth, Concep-
tions of Overcriminalization, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 407, 413-18 (2oo8) (section III of the
article, entitled "Risk and the Preventive Function of Criminal Law"); and second, that risk
creation might be morally blameworthy, yet it is usually not morally equivalent to harm
creation, thus is not worthy of the same punishment. This second assumption is hardly
a consensual one; see, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and
Results, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 879 (2000), claiming that results and causation do not matter for
desert.
121. Von Hirsch, supra note n6.
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Von Hirsch objects to the idea that one general test may be used to
determine the question of fair imputation in each and every instance, and
urges the construction of "reasons why the ultimate harm is appropriately
deemed the proper concern of the actor or actors."' 22 He then proposes
applying first the distinction between general prohibitions directed to the
public as a whole and specific prohibitions that are role-related.1 23 The
scope of general prohibitions (such as conspiracy and membership offenses)
"should be kept narrow. Not only should the harm be imputable to the
actor .. . but the conduct should be sufficiently obviously reprehensible for
its wrongness to be apparent to ordinary persons. Included would be mala
in se crimes of ordinary victimisation, plus infringement of certain basic and
well-understood public duties" (von Hirsch refers here to duties like paying
taxes).124 Where membership is in an exclusively terrorist organization, its
impropriety seems to be apparent to ordinary persons.1 25 The wrongness of
the conduct is affected by various factors. These include, first, the nature of
the expected harm, its probability, and its extent.' 26 The following discus-
sion of these factors draws inspiration from the justifications for conspiracy
doctrine, as these factors serve to justify modern conspiracy doctrine in ways
that are in part applicable to membership offenses as well.
As for the nature of the harm, prosecuting a conspiracy offense may be
justified partly on the basis of the expected harm to an important legal in-
terest, harm that will be caused by the conspired offense. Terrorist organ-
izations usually threaten grave harm to the most important protected legal
interests (and in this respect membership offenses are even easier to justify
122. Id. at 270.
123. Id. at 271-73.
124. Id. at 273.
125. The distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita is a complicated one, espe-
cially where conduct connected to mala in se prohibitions are concerned. For purposes of
the current discussion, I have presumed that prohibitions on conduct preceding the viola-
tion of mala in se prohibitions can themselves be categorized as ma/a in se prohibitions. For
a more detailed discussion, see Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the
Criminal Law, at lo4-19 (2oo8); R.A. Duff, Crime, Prohibition, and Punishment, 19
J. Applied Phil. 97 (2002).
126. Many of these considerations are relevant for conspiracy doctrine as well, and have
been mentioned in this context. See mainly, Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 11z
Yale L.J. 1307, 1310-27, 1338-39, 1375-76 (2003); Kremnitzer, supra note 75, at 242; Melii,
supra note 23, at 569; Wechsler et al., supra note to, at 958-61; Note, The Conspiracy
Dilemma, supra note 75, at 876-77; Model Penal Code, supra note 80, § 5.03 (P-388).
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than conspiracy doctrine). As implied in Part I, it may be appropriate to
limit liability solely to membership in organizations that threaten life or
limb rather than property. Property does not rise to other more funda-
mental interests, and where the threat is to property alone, the wrong
nature of mere passive-nominal membership is less apparent. 127
The extent of the harm threatened varies, but it is in any case greater
than the extent of the harm threatened by many conspiracies: organiza-
tions like Al-Qaeda threaten mega-scale attacks causing most extensive
harm, whereas other organizations threaten less dramatic attacks. Yet the
threshold that can justify early criminalization is crossed even by "modest"
terrorist organizations, especially noting the well-known dangers of group
activity that are discussed below.
The strongest justification for conspiracy doctrine concerns the special
danger posed by group activity, both in terms of the extent of the harm and
in terms of its probability, and this justification is surely applicable to mem-
bership offenses as well. The presence of participants in a group activity
increases both the potential harm and the chances of success: Groups
encourage risk-taking, which increases the magnitude of the expected harm.
Groups also allow division of labor and development of expertise, serve as
"schools" for efficient planning and commission of terrorist activities,
enable large-scale, complicated actions that are impossible for individual
perpetrators, and enable the execution of such complicated actions as well
as more simple ones relatively quickly, while also raising the risk of un-
planned violence. Furthermore, groups allow for continuity, and thus also
increase the chances of achieving the group's ultimate goals (such as coerc-
ing governments to take action).' 2 8
The actor's culpability also affects the question of "wrongness" as the
term is used by von Hirsch. Much (though not entirely) like an agreement
to commit a crime, making the choice to join an exclusively terrorist orga-
nization is significant and culpable: it usually reflects a (direct or indirect)
intent to commit violent attacks. It should be mentioned, though, that un-
like conspiracy doctrine, membership offenses do not require that the pros-
ecution prove such intent. In addition, it has already been noted in the
127. It can be noted that this liability-limiting principle does not necessarily apply to
modern conspiracy doctrines. An agreement to commit a crime is a more advanced and
accordingly more blameworthy act of preparation, and thus liability can be justified even
where less important legal interests are at stake.
178. See Wallerstein, supra note 28, at 24, 34.
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context of conspiracy that groups deepen the actor's antisocial attitudes
in a way that affects both dangerousness and culpability: Research dem-
onstrates that groups work to polarize the attitudes of members,129 dis-
courage doubts and dissent,' 30 encourage submerging one's self-interest
to that of the group, and in general, enhance members' determination
and their commitment to maximizing success. 13 1 Acting in a group also
reduces the sense of personal responsibility for the offense, thus making
the prohibited conduct psychologically easier. Because of the special
force leaders often have over followers, the more hierarchical the struc-
ture of a group, the stronger these psychological effects are. This is all
the more so with terrorist organizations as opposed to criminal conspir-
acies. Many such organizations work on the highly receptive substrata of
religious or ideological motivations, and possibly also against the back-
ground of a sense of deprivation and oppression; their methods of indoc-
trination can be particularly effective; often they promise martyrdom
with its significant psychological, social, and material benefits for the
member and her close family; and they usually enjoy strong support by
the member's immediate environment.132
Considering these factors, membership of exclusively terrorist organiza-
tions seems sufficiently wrongful. Next, it should be examined whether the
harm is indeed imputable to the actor. To decide this last issue, von Hirsch
suggests that the purpose of the norm should be considered first.' 33 Much
like modern conspiracy doctrine, prohibitions on all forms of membership
129. See Katyal, supra note z26. It may be noted that the justification that goes down to
the actor's determination (and thus both to his dangerousness and to his guilt) is usually
mentioned in the context of agreement-based conspiracy law, and in that context it focuses
on the act of agreement as manifesting strength of mind. However, this argument takes
different forms and emphasis in the present context.
130. Katyal, supra note 126, at 1321-22.
131. Psychological research demonstrates that in terrorist organizations, membership is
"being associated with a fusion of the young adult's individual identity with the group's
collective identity and goals." See Jeff Victoroff, The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and
Critique of Psychological Approaches, 49 J. Conflict Resol. 3, 10 (2005), referring to a
study by Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, & Laurita M. Denny, The Terrorists in Their
Own Words: Interviews with Thirty-Five Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists, 15
Terrorism & Pol. Violence 171 (2003).
132. Victoroff, supra note 129, at to.
133. Von Hirsch asks here "how the conduct is linked to the eventual risks";
Von Hirsch, supra note II6, at 270.
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in all sorts of terrorist organizations are primarily meant to prevent mem-
bers from committing attacks. Thus, it seems easier to fairly impute the
expected harm to members preparing for a terrorist attack rather than to
members who are merely potential accomplices.134 Passive members of ex-
clusively terrorist organizations are rightly taken to be potential perpetrators
of terrorist attacks (since, as explained above, their membership is a declara-
tion at least of an initial willingness to go forward), and therefore criminali-
zation seems justifiable in this respect.
It is suggested here that other considerations relevant for the question of
attribution can include the existence of any special circumstances that make
the reasonable and usual course of development less likely; and the reasonable
capability to appreciate in advance whether and how the conduct (member-
ship) might be integrated into the main offense (a terrorist attack). The chan-
ces that a member of an exclusively terrorist organization will not take a role
that integrates into the main offense are low, as there are hardly any such roles
in exclusively terrorist organizations (excluding roles such as secretaries or
drivers, yet members intending to fill those positions are still at an increased
risk of becoming operative terrorists, in comparison with nonmembers), and
the integration of the conduct in the eventual terrorist attack usually complies
with established routines of operation.
The above analysis has demonstrated that the (immoral) choice to join
an exclusively terrorist organization is a dangerous and culpable conduct
that seems sufficiently linked to the eventual harm to justify prosecution
under criminal statutes. Some counter considerations can be proposed.135
Passive-nominal membership is characteristic of an extremely early stage in
the advancing the terrorist activity' 36 (earlier than that of an agreement to
commit a crime), thus reflecting a relatively low level of dangerousness
and culpability that would increase only as the actor further acts and
approaches commission.' 3 7 Not all terrorist organizations aim at, or are
134. This conclusion regarding fair imputation further strengthens and sharpens our
earlier assumption regarding the difficulty of justifying membership offenses as forms of ex-
panded complicity.
135. See mainly Kremnitzer, supra note 75, at 243-45; Katyal, supra note 126, at 1334.
136. Thus membership offenses have been referred to as "pre-inchoate crimes"; Melii,
supra note 23, at 564.
137. See Daniel Ohana, Desert and Punishment for Acts Preparatory to the Commis-
sion of a Crime, 20 Canadian J. L. & Jurisprudence 113, 117 (2007).
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capable of, committing full-scale attacks. At the same time, individual perpe-
trators are able to cause serious harm almost immediately simply, for example,
by distracting a bus from its route. The dangerousness of group actions is re-
duced by the fact that the weakest link of the terrorist chain may foil the ter-
rorist plot simply by failing to do its part, as well as by the fact that group
actions are at a higher risk of being revealed, for example, by leaks of informa-
tion to the authorities. Fear of information leaks could be expected to cause
organizations to monitor their members, whilst this in turn could be expected
to sow distrust among the members, reduce motivation, and weaken com-
mitment to the organization and its activities. 138 Working in groups is more
expensive and requires additional effort. Many of the alleged psychological ef-
fects of groups have as their source the group's presumed hierarchical struc-
ture, yet according to certain intelligence agencies, at least some modern
terrorist organizations have a different, more horizontal structure of loosely
connected cells. 13 9
Yet, many of the considerations supporting criminalization do not lose
their strength entirely. Most importantly, reality demonstrates that the de-
structiveness of group activity is enormous despite the impediments: the most
deadly terrorist attacks have been and are performed by groups rather than by
individuals. Accordingly, it is submitted that the balance tips in favor of early
criminalization. Joining the organization should be punishable, assuming that
it was initiated or otherwise promoted by the actor (thus, having been regis-
tered by someone else would not suffice; 40 neither would a mere positive
138. This argument can also be used in support of criminalization. Katyal, supra note
126, at 1334, uses this argument to explain the positive law enforcement effects of conspir-
acy law.
139. CRS Report for Congress, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment (August 17,
2005): "According to this view, the threat from Al Qaeda has been replaced by a threat
from a number of loosely affiliated cells and groups that subscribe to Al Qaeda's ideology
but have little, if any, contact with remaining Al Qaeda leaders."
140. Criminalization of passive-nominal membership can in some cases create a "situational
offense" (a prohibition that does not require any volitional conduct; rather it applies to anyone
found in a certain situation). Whereas most of the modern prohibitions do not cover such cases,
the Israeli offenses were interpreted to cover such membership until recently, as described in
Part I. Under such an interpretation a person may be punished because, for example, someone
else registered him or her as a member of a terrorist organization, regardless of whether the actor
could have avoided this situation. Clearly, imposing punishment under such circumstances
violates the principle of guilt. A.P. Simester, On the So-Called Requirement For Voluntary
Action, I Buff. Crim. L. R. 403, 412 (1998). Meir Dan Cohen further adds, "The definition of
such an offence has no educational effect, it does not outline any preferable conduct, and the
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reply to a recruiter). Lack of later participation in the organization's activi-
ties should not affect this conclusion because of the possibility that the
member is part of a "sleeper cell." However, this possibility should be eval-
uated in light of the overall circumstances. A person who merely registered
as a member of an exclusively terrorist organization and then became a
peace activist has demonstrated that her registration was merely technical
and did not constitute substantive membership.
If passive-nominal membership in exclusively terrorist organizations is to
be criminalized under certain conditions, a fortiori most of the more dan-
gerous and more culpable forms of participation ("active membership")
should be criminalized as well. A detailed discussion of active forms of
membership is introduced later in the article. It can nevertheless be men-
tioned here that some of that conduct, such as possession of explosives, is
dangerous in and of itself and is accordingly criminalized by other criminal
prohibitions as well. Yet its criminalization under a prohibition of member-
ship is justified on the basis of the risk of future terrorist attacks, rather than
on the basis of any immediate danger. Other conduct, such as collecting or
receiving intelligence, is not always criminalized under other non-terrorist-
related prohibitions. Its criminalization, too, is justified on the basis of its
predominantly preparatory nature and its integration into the activity of a
dangerous organization.
Some active members such as secretaries or drivers take minor parts in
the dangerous activities of the organization, parts that have the nature of
(potential) aid rather than of preparation. It can be argued that this weak
and remote form of (potential) aid cannot justify criminalization. Neverthe-
less, criminalization of such forms of membership can be justified on the
same basis as passive membership: their weak and remote (potential) aid to
the terrorist effort is at the same time an expression of initial willingness to
take more dangerous preparatory roles, if asked to do so by their superiors.
At the very least, it exposes the actor to pressure to take such roles, pressure
punishment is not a deterrent factor but a means of arbitrary oppression"; see Meir Dan Cohen,
The "Actus Reus" and Offences of "Situation," 7 Is. L. Rev. 186, 191 (1972). At best, situational
offenses are interpreted as imposing an obligation to change the situation. Under this interpre-
tation, they create an obligation to act and thus put a particularly heavy burden on general free-
dom of action. See Mordechai Kremnitzer & Liat Levanon, Abetment to Crime by Omission:
Should There Be a Specific Legal Duty to Act?, 4 Alei Mishpat 175 (2005) (in Hebrew);
Mordechai Kremnitzer & Liat Levanon, Aid in Committing an Offence and Interpretation of
Criminal Statutes, 17 Bar Ilan Law Studies 403, 405-6 (2002) (in Hebrew).
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that would be very hard to resist for various reasons, including a mental
"slippery slope."
Before moving on, it should be noted that criminalization of all forms
of membership in exclusively terrorist organizations can perhaps be justi-
fied also on the basis of an omission to report or otherwise prevent the
materialization of a risk (the risk of terrorist attacks). Under this analysis,
the mere fact of membership establishes a specific link between the
member and the risk of terrorist attacks. Looked at from a crime preven-
tion perspective, the offense of membership is a tool for extracting infor-
mation from members of terrorist organizations, possibly in the course of
plea bargaining.4 ' This, however, seems like a shaky basis for criminali-
zation. Members do not necessarily know of any concrete terrorist plots,
and to the extent that they do, the question of criminalization should be
resolved with reference to such knowledge rather than to the fact of
membership.' 4 2 Needless to say, criminal offenses should not be police
intelligence tools.
B. Membership in Ancillary Organizations and
Dual-Purpose Organizations
Complications arise with regard to ancillary and dual-purpose organizations.
As demonstrated in Part I, liberal democracies usually prohibit various types
of links between individuals and ancillary or dual-purpose organizations.
Clearly, prohibition of some types of active preparatory membership in
such organizations is justified on the same lines as discussed above. Some
forms of active membership are fairly proximate to the traditional realm
of criminality.143 At times the relevant conduct is dangerous in and of
itself, as well as requiring the investment of a significant amount of
energy, and thus its implementation increases the actor's determination
to proceed with the commission of the offense.'" In such cases, criminali-
zation is justifiable subject to the above-mentioned guidelines and the
presence of a sufficiently strong mens rea requirement, as explained in the
Section D, below.
141. Katyal, supra note 1z6, at 1328-32.
142. Possibly, a unique dangerousness consideration applies here, too.
143. Kremnitzer, supra note 75, at 242.
144. Id. at 244.
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However, criminalization of more passive forms of membership as
well as of active civil forms of membership in ancillary or dual-purpose
organizations raises difficult questions of justification.' 4 5 Ancillary and
dual-purpose organizations have much less in common with conspiracies
whose only object is the commission of crimes: ancillary and dual-purpose
organizations do not necessarily aim to commit crimes, and some of their
activities may even have positive value, such as engaging in legitimate
political expression that deserves strong legal protection. Accordingly,
criminalization of membership therein can hardly rely on grounds similar
to those of conspiracy.
The main consideration in favor of criminalization is that ancillary or
dual-purpose organizations can be more effective in increasing the mem-
ber's commitment to terrorism: where an ancillary or dual-purpose orga-
nization provides financial support to the actor's family as part of its civil
activities, pressures can be imposed by threats of sanctions or the with-
holding of necessary benefits.' 4 6
Yet many other considerations work the other way. Sweeping criminal-
ization of passive and civil-active membership in ancillary or dual-purpose
organizations ignores the fact that these organizations cannot be rightfully
defined as terrorist organizations. As explained in Part I, only organiza-
tions working in concert with the prospect of committing terrorist attacks
can be so defined. Accordingly, where terrorist wings of dual-purpose or-
ganizations can be identified, criminalization of membership can be justi-
fied as explained above; but where separate wings cannot be so identified,
an examination of the actor's specific conduct-in terms of whether it is
preparatory or not-is due.
The member who is active in civil branches demonstrates that her
membership is not directed at terrorist attacks. Acting in a nonterrorist
sphere, she would not be exposed to requests or demands to take part in
terrorist activities. The passive member does not demonstrate lack of
willingness to participate in terrorist attacks; nevertheless it is still diffi-
cult to attribute the risk of terrorist attacks fairly in most cases. As men-
tioned above, the purpose of the norm is to stop potential perpetrators
145. The attempt by the Israeli Supreme Court to narrow the scope of local member-
ship offenses (all applying to various dual-purpose organizations), which was described in
Part I, is but one example that reflects these difficulties.
146. Ohana, supra note 137, at 137.
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at an early stage. Both on evidentiary and substantive levels, it is not
clear that the passive member of a dual-purpose organization, and all the
more so the member of an ancillary organization, actually prepares for
the commission of a terrorist attack rather than merely for performing
a task in the civil activities of the organization. Even where the member
may be viewed as providing aid to the commission of an attack, this aid
is significantly more remote from causing the harm than that of a
member in an exclusively terrorist organization. (The case of passively
consuming terrorism-oriented information, dealt with in Section C
below, is different and constitutes an exception).
Other considerations against criminalization should also be taken
into account. As passive-nominal membership in ancillary or dual-
purpose organizations can sometimes give rise to weak moral objections
(for example, where a doctor joins an organization because this is the
most effective way to provide medical care for a deprived population
living in the area), potential defendants' innate moral brakes might
not signal to them that their behavior might be prohibited. Meeting
the moral boundaries shared by the vast majority of the population is
an important component of true and fair advanced warning under
criminal law.
Prohibitions on passive or civil-active membership in ancillary or dual-
purpose organizations also pose the risk of unjustifiable violation of free-
dom of association, mainly of members who join the organization with
the prospect of civil activities in mind. Such membership is, at most, an
indirect expression of support of terrorism by way of association. This
expression lacks any specific terrorist content (such as concrete advances
to commit terrorist attacks), and in many cases the actor lacks intent to
promote an attack. Thus, such expression is neither sufficiently danger-
ous nor sufficiently culpable to justify infringement of an expressive
aspect of associational rights.147
147. The rights of members whose membership is a clear act of preparation of terrorist
attacks are not violated in the same manner. This is either because there is no right to as-
sociate for the purpose of committing deadly attacks or, if there is such a right, because the
balance tips in favor of its infringement when concrete steps toward the commission of
such attacks are taken. The constitutional doctrine of freedom of speech supports these
conclusions. To take the most obvious example, communication of words constituting
an agreement to commit a deadly attack is not protected under free speech clauses.
For criticism of this legal position, see, e.g., Susanne Baer, Violence: Dilemmas of
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As the U.K. Adams case and, to some extent, the U.S. Scales case (both
introduced in Part I) rightly demonstrate, violation of freedom of associa-
tion is not to be taken lightly. Because of its importance, we shall look at
the right of association more closely. Freedom of association is a funda-
mental right, specifically protected under most liberal constitutions' 4 8 and
under international conventions. 14' The importance of the liberty to asso-
ciate is deep-rooted and profound. It has been noted that the human mind
is developed by the reciprocal influence of associating human beings with
each other.15 0 Interpersonal relations form a part of our identity.1' They
are the substrate upon which personality develops; association is a method
of self-expression and of giving greater depth and scope to an individual's
needs, aspirations, and liberties, as well as allowing the individual to realize
her own capabilities. 152 Solidarity with informal groups is a potent mea-
sure for allaying anxieties, releasing aggressions, satisfying curiosity, and as-
suaging mischievous drives, 153 and fraternity may help to restore a sense of
self-importance bruised by the anonymity of life amidst great crowds.15
Democracy and Law, in Freedom of Speech and Incitement against Democracy, 63, 69-70
(David Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 2ooo).
148. To take a few examples, freedom of association is protected in Article 9 of the
German constitution, Article 23 of the Swiss constitution, Section 22 of the Spanish con-
stitution, Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Article 12 of the
Greek constitution.
149. Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), at 71,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., i plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8io (Dec. 10, 1948); Article ii of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Art. u(z), Nov. 4, 1950, CETS No. 005. Even in the United States, where freedom of as-
sociation is not specifically protected by the constitution, the Supreme Court has elevated
it to the level of a constitutional right derived from the First Amendment. See NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Scales, supra note 33.
iso. Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 132 (Francis Bowen trans., 1864) (1840).
151. George Kateb, The Value of Association, in Freedom of Association 35, 48 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1998): "I am my relationships; and if I as a self have intrinsic value, so do
all the relationships that are inextricably interwoven with my identity."
152. Amy Gutmann, An Introductory Essay, in Freedom of Association, id. 3, 4.
153. Daniel Ohana attributes those advantages to other preparatory acts such as surfing
the Internet or casually inquiring after close friend (see Ohana, supra note 137, at 116), but
it seems that association can fulfil the same functions.
154. See William 0. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1361,
1361-62 (1963) and the sources cited therein: Talcott Parsons, Certain Primary Sources and
Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World, in Conflicts of Power
in Modern Culture: Seventh Symposium 29, 45 (Lyman Bryson et al. eds., 1947);
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Other justifications for freedom of association put the spotlight
on the social and structural-democratic functions of associations.' 5 5
Associations allow members to develop their capacity to participate
actively in democratic life. The need for organized action is inherent
in modern political, economic, and civil realities that leave major
challenges in the hands of citizens. Interest groups are necessary for any
kind of effective advocacy. Organized action is the only type of action
that can effectively oppose immense government power (by itself,
an association contributing to general welfare). It can prevent the
state from exercising too substantial an influence over the individual
and over minorities,1 56 and it permits deprived groups "to contest
and ameliorate the structure of social power in ways that are not direct-
ly political."1 5 1 Small community associations also work to improve
citizens' quality of life by allowing opportunities for mutual help,
small-scale charity, and the like. Free association allows a rich, varied,
and culturally pluralistic civil society.' 58
Freedom of association is closely tied with other fundamental freedoms
such as the freedom of religion, freedom of thought, and freedom of
conscience. Most relevant for our discussion is the corresponding right of
freedom of speech and assembly.' 59 The similarities between freedom
of speech rationales and some (though not all) freedom of association
rationales highlight this point.' 60 So, too, does the historical fact that
prohibitions on association, much like prohibitions on expression, have
Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, 1878-1898, at 288-90 (1938). See also Thomas Emerson,
Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Yale L.J. 1, 4.(1964).
155. Kateb, supra note 150, at 37.
156. De Tocqueville, supra note 149, at z8.
157. Stuart Woolman, Freedom of Association, in Constitutional Law of South Africa,
ch. 22 at 2 (M. Chaskalson et al. eds., 1996).
I8. Id.
159. As mentioned above, in the United States associational rights have been derived
from the First Amendment.
16o. For the rationales for freedom of speech, see, e.g., Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech
6-36 (zoo7). The American analysis of freedom of association emphasizes the close link
between association and expression, and some even go as far as claiming that the right of
association is a legally empty right. See Emerson, supra note 153, at 4 (1964). Possibly,
this has to do with the structure of the American constitution that does not contain specific
reference to freedom of association (its protection is derived from the First Amendment). It
is arguable that this position ignores mainly (but not only) the distinct arguments from
personality for protection of associations, as indicated above.
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often been used as a tool for political oppression,161 and the legal fact that
some expressions can deem an association illegal' 62 or alternatively serve as
indications of its illegality.1 6 3 Association may be necessary to truly realize
one's freedom of speech.'64 Only associates who are empathetic toward
one's ideas would be sufficiently attentive to make the experience of self-
expression a fulfilling one. The amalgamation of intellectual resources allows
for fuller development of members' positions. Association is also an impor-
tant phase in the process of transforming private and personal ideas into
concepts for discussion in the public sphere.16 5
Hand in hand with its unique importance, freedom of association is
also uniquely vulnerable, as the above brief cross-jurisdictional overview
demonstrates. Legislators, governments, and prosecution authorities all
favor dealing with terrorism by way of broad limitations on association.
Reasons are varied,16 6 but one is particularly noteworthy: in belonging to
several minorities simultaneously (defendants, political-ideological minorities,
161. See above; Cole, supra note 30.
162. See, e.g., Israeli Criminal Code 1977 § 145(l), where encouragement or incitement
to perform one of a given list of prohibited acts deems the association illegal; Israeli
(Emergency) Defence Regulation 1945 § 84()(a), which defines an illegal association as an
association whose constitution or propaganda encourages, incites, or recommends one of a
list of activities or attitudes; Offences Against the State Act 1939 § 8 (Act No. 13/1939)
(Ir.), which defines "unlawful organization" as an organization that promotes, encourages,
or advocates some specific illegal activities.
163. See, for example, the Canadian Criminal Code § 83.18(4), entitled "Participation in
Activity of Terrorist Group": "In determining whether an accused participates in or con-
tributes to any activity of a terrorist group, the court may consider, among other factors,
whether the accused (a) uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies,
or is associated with, the terrorist group. . . ."
164. Emerson, supra note 153, at 22, states: "The purpose of a system of freedom of
expression-to allow individuals to realize their potentialities through reason and agree-
ment rather than force and violence-cannot be effectively achieved in modern society
unless free rein is given to association designed to enhance the scope and influence of
communication."
165. See also Woolman, supra note 1s6, ch. zz at i; S. Mohan, Freedom of Association,
3(4) Central India L.Q. 431, 432 (1990).
166. Kremnitzer, supra note I. See also Melii, supra note 23, at 564-65; Preempting
Justice, supra note 69, at 15. Moreover, prosecution for mere membership is in itself used as
a preventative means, a tool for (very) early warning and (very) early intervention designed to
"nip the risk of terrorist activity in the bud"; Abrams, supra note 38, at 7. Abrams further
refers to the "ubiquitous quality" of the American material support offenses, and mentions
that they are being used as "catch-all" offenses; id.
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and many times religious and/or ethnic minorities), members of radical organ-
izations such as ancillary or dual-purpose organizations are typically subject to
human rights violations by majorities.167
Prohibitions on passive membership in ancillary or dual-purpose organ-
izations would presumably violate the freedom to associate within certain
branches of structured organizations that seek to further concrete aims in
the public sphere. The level of protection provided to these branches
should be particularly strong: in addition to their key role with regard to
the individual's personality, they have an added social value, their activity
is expressive in nature, and historically, they have been the target of polit-
ical persecution.16 8 Thus, arguably, society should be willing to internalize
some risks to protect these branches. It is submitted that where the chan-
ces of membership materializing as a terrorist attack are less than high,
membership in such organizations should not be criminalized. In other
words, if it is impossible to prohibit passive membership in only the ter-
rorist branches, no prohibition should be imposed.
C. Fine-Tuning the Distinctions
In concluding that criminalization of both passive and active membership
can at times be justifiable, the technique of criminalization should be dis-
cussed. Significantly, there is no place to formulate one catch-all offense
addressing both passive and active membership. The broad brush of
catch-all membership offenses, which can include anything from mere
nominal membership to active and even leadership participation, violates
the principle of guilt and the derivative requirement of fair labelling by
bundling together significantly different types of behavior and attributing
the same stigma and potential sentencing guidelines to them all.1 6 9
Furthermore, the term "membership" is an extremely vague one: it is
unclear what types of behavior constitute membership (an expression of
consent to an offer to join an organization? attending an organization's
public or private assembly?). It is also unclear where membership ends and
other criminal conduct such as support or participation in the activities of
167. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Liat Levanon, Victims' Constitutional Rights under
Substantive Criminal Law (work in progress, on file with the author).
168. See also Woolman, supra note 156, ch. zz at 8.
169. Melii, supra note 23, addresses the problematically wide scope of membership of-
fenses, e.g. on 565.
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a terrorist organization begins. Such vagueness does not comply with a
commitment to the principle of fair advanced warning.
Being broad and vague, sweeping membership offenses assign signifi-
cant powers to the prosecution to decide whom to investigate, whom to
threaten with prosecution, and whom to prosecute. Here as well, the prin-
ciple of legality and the requirement of fair advanced warning are compro-
mised; and in addition, there is the risk of the prosecution employing its
powers in a prejudicial manner or at the whim of government politics.
Accordingly, distinct and well-defined offenses should be formulated. The
aim of the remainder of this section is to identify concrete conduct that re-
flects sufficiently strong links to terrorist activity to justify its criminalization.
Significantly, punishability is determined on the basis of links to terrorist ac-
tivity, rather than to terrorist organizations. An actor who joins an organiza-
tion should be punished (if at all) on the basis of proximity to terrorist
attacks-proximity that is formed by the act of joining-and an actor who
trains in weapons should be punished more severely on the same basis (as well
as on the basis of the immediate danger she creates by using weapons). Thus,
there is no place for punishing the latter twice-once on the basis of her
membership and a second time on the basis of her training in weapons.
The punishability of any such conduct should be determined mainly
according to the distinctions that were proposed above-its classification
as active or passive, as well as the nature of the organization at issue.
However, these distinctions are insufficiently delicate. This section intro-
duces additional necessary distinctions when addressing conduct that can-
not be sharply identified as either passive or active, or when the distinction
between passive and active conduct is insufficient.
Different forms of conduct linking individuals to terrorist organizations
may be ranked. On the lowest level is passive-nominal membership, refer-
ring to a mere external expression of willingness to join a group, such as a
positive answer given to a recruiter, possibly motivated by factors other
than strong identification with the group's purposes, such as fear of the
group or weakness of mind, and even a self-initiated act of joining the
group, which does not lead to any other associations with it. Such conduct
is, at most, a potential act of preparation that is extremely preliminary and
does not reflect particularly strong determination (or even serious consid-
eration of the possibility of committing an offense). Although not poten-
tial acts of preparation, they might be acts of mere potential spiritual
aid to terrorist attacks. At the same time, such conduct may have some
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characteristics of political expression. Accordingly, as explained in Sections
A and B, such conduct should generally not be criminalized, 170 with the
exception (mentioned above) of self-initiated or otherwise self-promoted
membership in exclusively terrorist organizations that have demonstrated
the determination and capability to commit highly destructive attacks.
A somewhat higher ranking could be one of predominantly passive
membership, referring to the consumption of information distributed by
the group to its members, and possibly also to participating in group
activities, yet predominantly as a recipient (for example, attending lectures,
learning groups, or discussions). Such conduct, too, is usually so remote
from commission that it is hard to categorize it as either preparation or
attempted complicity. There may be a place to make distinctions according
to the dangerousness of the conduct, to the fundamentality of the right
in which the member is engaged, and to the legitimacy of its expressive
aspects. Thus, consuming merely abstract-theoretical information such as
general ideology or principles of religion should be distinguished from con-
suming dangerous concrete knowledge with possible practical implications,
such as the locations of potential destinations of terrorist attacks. The first
should never be punished (arguably not.even where the organization is
exclusively terrorist, because of its high independent value), but the second
would appear to be appropriate for criminalization as an act of preparation
both where the organization is exclusively terrorist and where it is a dual-
purpose organization (or an ancillary organization, though such activity
would probably be less common in such organizations).
The next level of predominantly active membership follows, with actual
contribution to the conduct or arrangement of group activities (for example,
training, recruiting, teaching, arranging meetings). As demonstrated in Part I,
both the American and the Canadian prohibitions specifically address such
conduct; yet, they are, at times, bundled together with more passive conduct.
(In Canada, for example, the court may consider, in addition to active
conduct, also conduct such as receiving benefits from a terrorist group).
Predominantly active membership in exclusively terrorist organizations
can be legitimately criminalized. When it comes to active membership in
ancillary or dual-purpose organizations, it might be appropriate to differenti-
ate amongst the above-mentioned parameters. Thus, providing lodging,
170. Such membership by an authoritative figure with a special spiritual stand poses a
more difficult question, but it seems that it may be best to leave it to general incitement law.
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transportation, or some physical assets-all prohibited under the American
material support offenses-is different from teaching passionate ideology
(possibly more dangerous, but carrying a clear expressive nature), which is, in
turn, different still from training in weapons (clearly the most active and
dangerous, and lacking any expressive aspect). Each of these forms of
conduct is worthy of a more detailed discussion in another forum. Where the
activity is by nature a clearly preparatory one, such as training, criminalization
is straightforwardly due. Other activities require more careful consideration.
The highest ranking of membership is where the member takes on a
leadership role as a key person in the organization. Whereas it seems
inappropriate to punish civil leaders, provided they are indeed merely civil
leaders and not only in title, terrorist leaders should be punished severely.
D. Mens Rea
As demonstrated in Part I, current prohibitions on membership in terrorist
organizations require only a weak mens rea, mainly knowledge of the terrorist
nature of the organization. Part II suggested that this fact distances member-
ship offenses from the well-established realm of criminality, as determined by
doctrines of derivative liability. Part III further noted the relevance of blame-
worthiness to criminalization of remote harm. Accordingly, it is carefully
submitted that prohibitions on membership should usually require intent to
participate in the commission of a terrorist attack, even if the details of such
an attack do not need to be carefully planned at the time of the act. Where
the prohibition is justified by its preparatory nature, intent provides the act
with this nature, at least as far as we follow Anglo-American doctrines of
attempt and criminal preparation; and in any case, intent is necessary to
provide sufficient guilt in light of the weakness of the factual element (remote
acts of preparation or acts of potential spiritual aid).
Nevertheless, where the factual element is sufficiently strong-for example,
in the case of weapons training, which is, in and of itself, dangerous and poses
a considerable future risk-this requirement may be abandoned.
CONCLUSIONS
The law has not yet managed to find an appropriate equilibrium in its
treatment of membership in terrorist organizations. Some laws prohibit
membership, opening the door to convictions on the basis of various links
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with terrorist organizations, from passive-nominal memberships to leader-
ship roles. Being blatantly over-inclusive, legislative and judicial mechanisms
have developed to narrow the scope of these prohibitions: Current English
legislation provides a defense whereby the membership started before the or-
ganization was proscribed as terrorist and there was no active participation
after the proscription; previously, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal re-
quired that the member actively associate herself with the organization; the
United States Supreme Court confined the scope of a membership offense
to active membership accompanied by intent to commit attacks; whereas the
Israeli Supreme Court clarified that not every tenuous connection with a ter-
rorist organization can constitute membership. Similarly, the German inter-
pretation of the prohibition on membership requires that, after joining, the
activity toward the terrorist objective must continue to progress.
Other laws are less inclusive. They provide a list of active conduct that
forms a link with the organization sufficient to justify criminalization. But
where the law is of such a nature, the legal system usually creates mechanisms
broadening the scope of the offense. The Canadian prohibition on participa-
tion in the activity of terrorist groups allows the court to consider the defend-
ant's use of words, symbols, or other objects representing the group, as well as
his association with persons who constitute the group. And the current Amer-
ican material support offenses have been widely used by the prosecution as
catch-all offenses, and have been interpreted by some lower courts as includ-
ing even "supplying" oneself as a member of the organization. In both cases
legal literature has advanced the claim that, in effect, the offenses are actually
almost identical to the over-inclusive membership clauses.
This article suggests that these legal developments demonstrate unease re-
garding the definitions of membership offenses. Legal systems, it is submitted,
have been struggling without much success to sketch out prohibitions that
would cover only cases justifying criminalization. The inability to find an ap-
propriate legal equilibrium in the form of a well-balanced definition reflects
the acknowledgment that sometimes even weak membership is dangerous
and culpable, and should therefore be prohibited; yet, in many other cases
its criminalization would be unjustified and may even encroach upon
fundamental liberties. The article suggests tackling these difficulties by
taking three main routes: first, by narrowing the definition of terrorist
organizations passive membership of which is prohibited to include only
exclusively terrorist organizations, second, by making various distinctions
amongst active forms of participation in the activities of these and other
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(ancillary and dual-purpose) organizations to include only the wrongful and
culpable ones and to differentiate amongst varying levels of wrongful and
culpable participation, and third, by setting stricter mens rea requirements in
appropriate cases.
It may be appropriate to end with an abstraction. The analysis that has
been introduced here demonstrates that delineating justifiable prohibitions
on membership of terrorist organizations can be achieved in two ways. One
possibility is drawing membership offenses closer to well-established criminal
law doctrines such as attempt and complicity, primarily through requiring a
strong mens rea such as specific intent that a terrorist attack be committed (in
appropriate cases), and also by requiring that some substantial step be taken
in preparation of the attack.
Another possibility, which may be combined with the former, is drawing
membership offenses closer to well-established constitutional doctrines-for
example, through requiring at least a realistic prospect that the membership
would materialize as involvement in a terrorist attack, and where freedom of
speech considerations apply in full force-by applying the stricter freedom of
speech tests-for example, those requiring a reasonable possibility or even a
high probability that the membership would thus materialize (it is possible to
opt for a test that includes an element of immediacy).' 7 1 Preferably, these
constitutional standards would be applied by the legislature in drafting
precisely worded prohibitions rather than by the courts. The evaluation
of the dangerousness of terrorist groups, as set forth above, is an exam-
ple for the application of these constitutional standards.
Observing prohibitions on membership in terrorist organizations thus
exposes the rich web of interrelationships amongst general doctrines of
criminal law, general principles of criminalization (which may or may not
be constitutionally protected), and general doctrines of constitutional law.
Criminal law doctrines manifest a constitutional balance between rights of
victims, rights of defendants, and state power. Criminalization that goes be-
.yond well-established doctrines of criminal law should therefore be scruti-
nized carefully as there is a significant risk of its violating constitutional
balances and infringing upon (possibly constitutional) principles of freedom.
171. For critical discussion of constitutional tests for protection of freedom of speech,
see Morderchai Kremnitzer & Liat Levanon, Freedom of Speech in the Judgments of
Chief Justice Aharon Barak, in The Judicial Legacy of Aharon Barak 170-8o (Celia W.
Fassberg et al. eds., 2009) (in Hebrew).
